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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains two chapters that study corporate cash holdings and cor-
porate management. Below are the individual abstracts for each chapter.
Chapter 1: Easy Come, Easy Go: Cheap Cash and Bad Corporate Decisions
This chapter investigates the relationship between the sources of a firm’s cash reserves
and its investments decisions. I explore the information on the cash flow statement to create
the first dataset that organizes firms’ cash holdings by whether it comes from: Financing,
Operating or Investment activities. This dataset allows me to empirically revisit the free
cash flow hypothesis by separating what is actually free cash from what it is not. I find
that the overspending evidence previously associated to firms with large cash holdings are
driven by firms with high reserves coming from operations. My evidence is consistent with
theories of the disciplinary effects of external financing, however it is inconsistent with agency
explanations of the behavior of firms with large cash reserves. As an alternative explanation
to agency I argue that the manager’s perception of the opportunity costs of their cash reserves
might be affecting their investment decisions.
Chapter 2: Back in Style: Contrasts in Style and CEO Impact on Corporate Policy
This chapter proposes a new approach to study how corporate policies change upon the
replacement of the CEO. We develop a measure that explores the differences in style between
the exiting CEO and the incoming CEO. We find that corporate policies change significantly
in firms when the new CEO has a different style compared to the previous CEO. Whereas, in
firms that the CEO is replace by someone with a very similar style, corporate policies remain
largely unchanged. For the most part, our results are not significantly different if we consider
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exogenous exits (e.g. death, illness, and natural retirements). Thus, the relation between
CEOs and subsequent corporate policy is not driven by the characteristics of the exiting
CEO, but is instead determined largely by the characteristics of the new CEO. The evidence
suggests that boards are endogenously selecting the new CEO to have the characteristics
that the board members think will best serve the firm. Thus, it is difficult to separate the
role of the board from the CEO when explaining corporate policy.
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Chapter 1
Easy Come Easy Go: Cheap Cash and
Bad Corporate Decisions
1.1 Introduction
Corporate cash holding has become a favorite topic of the popular media, politicians and aca-
demics after its recent spike. The finance literature has sought an understanding of whether
this excessive liquidity is optimal and has tried to predict how firms with large amounts of
cash will spend it. Although the analysis of firm cash reserves has been explored extensively
in the corporate finance literature, a few basic and crucial questions remain unanswered:
Where does the cash that firms are currently holding came from? Did it come from opera-
tions, financing activities, or the sale of assets? Does the manner in which firms save their
cash predict how they are going to spend it?
This paper seeks to determine which sources firms are using to build their cash reserves.
I develop a method that treats the three cash flow statement categories (operating, financ-
ing and investing) as separate accounts through which cash enters and leaves the firm to
1
identify the origin of the cash. Thereafter, I create a new dataset in which each dollar in
the firms’ cash holdings is labeled to determine the reserve’s current composition. This new
data set puts me in a unique position to explore how firms with different savings profiles
spend their money differently. Consequently, it allows me to test the predictions of different
hypothesis about cash management in a completely new framework. For instance, excessive
cash holdings is considered a source of agency conflict. However, different sources of cash
should give the manager different levels of flexibility. Firms with more cash from financing
activities should be subject to more monitoring than firms with more cash from operations.
With this new data set I will be able to test these differences and, for example, find that
the free cash flow hypothesis predictions for high cash holdings do not seem to be precise for
firms that have excessive amount of cash holdings coming from financing activities.
My first approach was to compare how firms with more cash from financing activities
perform in their Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activity when compared to firms with more
cash from operations. Using the framework developed by Harford (1999), I find that firms
with a greater percentage of cash from financing activities behave differently than similarly
positioned firms with a percentage of cash from operations. Harford (1999) finds that firms
with more cash holdings are more likely to engage in M&A activities and that such activi-
ties generally destroy value. I find evidence that firms that derive their cash reserves from
operations are largely responsible for the reputation for poor M&A judgment generally asso-
ciated with all cash rich firms. Firms with greater amounts of cash obtained from financing
activities are less likely to engage in M&A activities, and they do not destroy value if they
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do engage in such activities. In other words, these latter firms are not overspending the cash
they have on their books.
Moreover, I analyze how firms with different compositions in their cash reserves perform
in their share repurchases. The results reinforce the contrasts found on the M&A analysis.
I find that firms with greater proportions of cash from financing activities perform better
than firms with greater proportions of operational cash. In fact, the positive announcement
return for repurchases previously associated to firms with high cash Grullon and Michaely
(2004) is driven by firms with high volumes of cash from financing activities. Firms with a
larger fraction of their cash coming from operations actually present negative announcement
returns to their repurchases. This findings shed a new light on this relationship because it
provides evidence against the main explanation for the results found previously. The expla-
nation given by the existing literature for the reason firms with large cash reserves present
a positive announcement return for their share repurchases is that, by doing a repurchase
these firms are alleviating the agency conflict generated by excess cash. For these reasons
investors will respond positively to this action. My results contradicts this interpretation,
because firms with more cash from operations are subject to more agency problems. If we
were simply dealing with an agency conflict we should observe higher announcement returns
for firms with high cash from operations. Investors should respond positively to the fact
that firms that could potentially overspend their cash, are instead returning it to them.
In light of this puzzling result, I seek for an alternative explanation for the repurchases
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results exploring the reasons why these contrasts in returns are observed. I argue that there
are two complementary hypotheses to explain the difference in the behavior of firms with
more cash from financing activities compared to firms with more cash from operations. The
first possible explanation is the disciplinary effect of external financing. Until now, the liter-
ature has treated cash holdings simply as free cash. However, this assumption seems to be
too broad in light of the framework developed in this paper. Cash from financing activities
does not give the manager as much financial slack as cash from operations. The disciplinary
effects of debt are well documented in the literature Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen
(1986); Hart and Moore (1995). In addition, every time a firm issue equity it will have its
books scrutinized by the market Easterbrook (1984). After the issue, we should also expect
that new investors will be paying more attention to what the manager is doing, until they
gain confidence in her. Furthermore, the primary investors in an IPO or a SEO are generally
insiders, institutional investors, underwriters, and preferred clients who are more sophisti-
cated and after increasing their stake on the firm will likely keep the manager on a tighter
leash.
The first hypothesis explains why firms with more cash from financing activities are likely
to behave better; however, it does not explain why firms with more cash from operations use
their financial freedom to systematically invest in “bad deals”. Better deals would imply bet-
ter returns for the firm, a higher salary and a longer tenure; thus, these managers should be
searching for good investments and this should be captured in the data. These firms should
have returns at least as good as the average firm. In my second hypothesis, I argue that the
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inexpensive nature of cash from operations, combined with the low returns associated with
this cash, misleads the management team in its calculation of the opportunity costs of cash.
For this reason, they use an incorrect cost of capital when evaluating the investments they
are going to pursue.
In order to find evidence for my second hypothesis, I explore firm’s misvaluations around
the repurchase announcement. If firms with more cash from operations have a superior un-
derstanding of their cost of capital, they will be able to calculate their intrinsic value more
precisely and therefore time the market more efficiently. My results are consistent with this
idea, I find that firms with a higher percentage of their cash coming from financing activities
are less likely to do a share repurchase when their stock is overvalued. Firms with more
cash from operations, on the other hand, time the market poorly and are more likely to do
a repurchase when they are overvalued. This evidence reinforce the results against agency
problems. Firms with more cash from operations seem to be having worst outcomes to their
share repurchase because they time the market poorly and not because the market is re-
sponding to some sort of agency problem this firm has.
I find supportive evidence for this hypothesis in the final step of my analysis. I observe
the behavior of firms holding greater percentages of cash from operations with respect to the
returns on their cash investments. I argue that these firms are underestimating their costs of
capital, because cash from operations has no direct costs and has a low return. If the returns
on their cash investments are higher, the direct opportunity costs are higher. Therefore,
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firms with higher returns on their cash investments should better understand opportunity
costs of cash and consequently make better deals. I investigate how firms with different
returns on their cash holding make different decisions when making an acquisition. I find
that firms with a large proportion of cash reserves coming from operations who have higher
returns on their cash investments are less likely to bid on an acquisition than the same type
of firm with lower returns. Moreover, these same firms with higher returns on their cash
investments present higher announcement returns than similar firms with low returns on
their cash holdings. This offers some evidence that the perception of the opportunity costs
of cash plays an important role in how firms decide to invest it.
In addition, my analysis of cash holdings also allows me to study their historical com-
position. I begin my analysis by ascertaining the origin of these cash reserves. I find that
the recent spike in cash holdings is primarily a result of an increase in the accumulation of
cash from operations. This picture has changed in the past decade. Prior to 2000, almost
1/3 of the cash firms held had come from financing activities. After 2000, there was a sig-
nificant increase in cash reserves from operations that was not accompanied by a spike in
cash from financing activities. Nevertheless, even with the large amounts of cash currently
on the books of firms, the amount of cash from financing activities never actually decreased.
Out of the $2 trillion currently on the books of US public firms, $250 billion came from
financing activities. In addition, consistent with Dittmar and Duchin (2012), I find that the
recent increase in cash is concentrated in the hands of a few firms that accumulated it from
their stable stream of profits (operations). When I normalize the cash reserves by the firm’s
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total assets, I find that firms hold a similar proportion of their assets on cash from financing
activities and operating activities, on average, and that this proportion is actually slightly
greater for cash from financing activities than from operations (because of the skewing of
the distribution of cash from operations). Therefore, cash from financing activities plays an
important role on the firm’s cash management.
Second, I check whether the behavior of the cash flow and cash holdings variables sep-
arated by source is consistent with their aggregate counterpart found on COMPUSTAT.
To accomplish this, I compare the distributions of and changes in the variables created by
my methodology with the distributions of and changes in total cash. The total flows from
the three accounts (Operations, Financing and Investment Activity) consistently track the
changes in total cash holdings. In addition, their mean and the standard deviation are
consistent with the COMPUSTAT variables. I also observe that there is not a significant
discrepancy in how much cash from operations firms are holding across firms and that firms
usually have more cash from financing activities in the beginning of their lives. Finally, I
decomposed the cash from financing activities to determined whether the cash came from
debt or equity. Following McKeon (2013) I also separate equity issuances by wether they
were initiated by the firm or by investors. I found that during the 1970’s and the 1980’s
debt was the most popular source of cash from financing activities. Consistent with McLean
(2011), after the 1990’s cash from equity increase its share and it currently represents the
majority of the cash from financing activities. Consistent with McKeon (2013) investor ini-
tiated equity issuance is increasing its share over the years.
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Furthermore, I investigate whether any of the separated cash holding variables have a
transitory characteristic. One may be concerned, for instance, that all cash from financing
activities were previously earmarked and that they would only stay on the firm’s books for
a short period of time until the earmarked investment is realized. My results show that
this is not true; the persistence of cash from operations, cash from financing activities and
total cash holdings are similar. Therefore, different firms use different sources for their cash
management and none of the separated cash variables has a transient characteristic.
The results show that deconstructing the cash holdings can teach us something useful
about firms. Cash composition reveal relevant cross-sectional differences between firms, not
captured by other variables available in the data. This distinction will be useful for the
future empirical analysis in corporate finance, as we should consistently see differences be-
tween these two groups, regardless of the problem we are considering. In addition to that,
the results change the perception of efficient cash holdings allocation. Up to this point,
efficient cash holdings were determined simply by a level characterized by the firm’s and its
industry’s characteristics. This paper shows that we need to add another dimension into
considerations, because two firms with the same cash levels could behave very differently
depending on their cash composition.
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1.2 Connection to Existing Literature
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, to the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper that explores the different ways that companies accumulate
cash and examines whether cross-sectional differences in cash composition provide meaning-
ful information about the way the firm will end up spending the money. Most of the existing
literature about cash has built upon the framework developed by Jensen (1986), Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) which treats cash reserves as a source of
agency conflict. The conflict between managers and owners is built into the structure of a
public firm Jensen and Meckling (1976); Hart and Moore (1995); Holmstrom (1979), and free
cash flows aggravate this situation. Free cash flows give the manager discretion to decide
how to spend firm money Jensen (1986). Harford (1999) finds evidence of the free cash
flow hypothesis on a firm’s M&A activity, while Grullon and Michaely (2004) observe that
information asymmetry drives the positive stock reaction of share repurchase for cash-rich
firms.
The previous literature assumes that cash holdings are simply a pile of free cash flow
Harford (1999) and ignore the fact that cash holdings may also be a result of financing ac-
tivities. Kim and Weisbach (2008) and Hertzel and Li (2010) find evidence that companies
are also using SEOs and IPOs in their cash management and McLean (2011) shows an in-
crease in the use of these instruments for cash management over the years. If, for instance,
firms are holding cash from debt, we should expect the disciplinary effects of debt Jensen
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and Meckling (1976); Hart and Moore (1995) to attenuate or even offset the agency conflict
effects that come with the increase in cash holdings. To the best of my knowledge this is the
first paper that attempts to label each dollar of the firm to try to separate what is actual
free cash from what it is not.
There are also positive aspects of cash holdings, according to the literature. Using inter-
nal financing, firms can avoid debt overhang problems Hart and Moore (1995) and adverse
selection as a result of issuing equity Myers and Majluf (1984). These types of financing fric-
tion make external financing costly and internal financing beneficial. Therefore, one should
expect firms with more investment opportunities and more information asymmetry to have
higher cash reserves. This result is well documented in the existing empirical literature1.
In addition, this paper also connects to the literature that uses the precautionary motive
to explain the recent increase in cash holdings in US public firms Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009); Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2012).
Another goal of this paper is to show that cash from financing activities actually presents
the management team with a clearer idea of their costs of capital. To properly time the
market, firms will require good knowledge of their cost of capital to price their assets cor-
rectly. In the M&A literature, it is well documented that misvaluation drives acquisition
activity (e.g. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan, 2005; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Agrawal, Jaffe,
1See for example: Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Harford (1999), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Gao, Harford, and Li (2012), Farre-Mensa (2011)
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and Mandelker, 1992). In addition, firms are more likely to make repurchases when they are
undervalued Baker and Wurgler (2002); Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995). In
summary, timing the market is one of the primary concerns of a firm in making its finan-
cial decisions Graham and Harvey (2001). However, evidence shows that managers do not
have a good understanding of even the concept of the cost of capital Kruger, Landier, and
Thesmar (2011). Miscalculating the cost of capital may lead to misvaluations in both M&A
and repurchase activity, which may, in turn, explain the negative returns in connection with
their announcements. The incorrect use of cost of capital in different divisions is an example
of this anomaly previously found in the literature. In a recent paper Kruger, Landier, and
Thesmar (2011) find evidence that managers erroneously use the cost of capital calculated
on a firm-wide basis to make investment decisions for separate divisions of the firm; certain
managers actually admit they are doing this Graham and Harvey (2001). In this paper, I
argue that this problem may be even worse than previously thought.
Finally, this paper complements our understanding of the recent increase in the cash
holdings of US firms Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). By separating the different sources
of cash, this paper reveals that the recent spike may be mostly explained by an increase in
accumulation of cash from operations. However, consistent with Dittmar and Duchin (2012)
I find that the cash from operations is concentrated in the hands of a few firms that benefited
from a steady stream of profits and that cash from financing activities plays an important
role in the firm’s cash management.
11
1.3 Hypotheses
The goal of this paper is to analyze the cross-sectional differences between firms with different
cash compositions. In this section, I develop hypotheses to try to explain why there should
be differences between firms with more cash from financing activities compared to firms with
more cash from operations.
It is well documented in the theoretical literature about cash holdings that free cash
flow will generate agency problems Jensen (1986). Until now, the empirical literature has
treated cash reserves as a pile of free cash Harford (1999). ); however, this literature ignored
the fact that cash reserves can come from different sources, including debt. Debt has a
disciplinary effect Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986); Hart and Moore (1995). Cash
reserves from debt are not considered free cash, and when the management team decides to
spend the money, it will be subject to the disciplinary characteristics of debt. Consequently,
managers will be more careful. As opposed to debt, equity has no disciplinary effect built
into it. There is no threat of default, and there is therefore no automatic punishment for a
bad investment. However, there are at least two reasons why cash from an equity issuance
may also decrease management’s freedom. First, in general, the initial investors who obtain
access to an equity offering will be company insiders, institutional investors, underwriters,
and preferred clients. These investors are generally more sophisticated and more likely to
monitor the firm; if they increased their stake in the firm, they will be more attentive to
where the money is going. Second, new investors will be closely watching their investment
until they actually know and trust the management team. Over time, familiarity with the
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management team may decrease the benefits of monitoring.
Hypothesis 1 Firms with more cash from financing activities will be subject
to more monitoring
The first hypothesis explains why managers of firms with more cash from operations
would be more likely to overspend the money, but does not explain why they systematically
make bad investments. Better investments would yield higher returns, which would conse-
quently increase their salary and their tenure. Thus, it is not clear that the manager will
systematically abuse the freedom given to them. Even with the financial freedom to invest in
whatever they choose, managers should rationally be searching for good investments. This
fact should be observed in the data, and these managers should perform at least as well as
the average firm. I argue that such managers may miscalculate the opportunity costs of cash
because cash from operations has no direct costs and low returns.
Calculating the costs of capital for a firm can be demanding. Because a management
team addresses a multitude of problems on a daily basis, it may overlook important nuances
of the opportunity costs of cash Kruger, Landier, and Thesmar (2011). A manager may think
of the opportunity costs of cash simply as how much the cash is earning at the moment.
In other words, he could be thinking, “if my cash is currently earning 2% per year and I
can secure an investment that is 4% per year, this should be a good deal,” which, of course,
would ignore the fact that he must use WACC for all firm investments. Cash from financing
activities would hinder this because it is the most expensive type of cash a firm can have
on its books; with the firm’s cash coming from financing activities, the manager would have
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a clear understanding of the costs of that cash. Thus, in making an investment decision, it
should be easier to be more careful with the evaluation calculations. For this reason, I expect
firms with more cash from financing activities to make more careful investment decisions.
Hypothesis 2 Firms with more cash from financing activities will have a better
understanding of their costs of capital
1.4 Data
This paper constructs new variables to determine how firms save cash and then seeks to un-
derstand whether information about how firms save cash provides useful information about
how firms use the cash. Therefore, I look first to see whether there is a consistent pattern of
this type of firm across different branches of the literature, particularly as it relates to M&A
activities and share repurchases. For this reason, the data for this paper comes from several
sources.
The backbone of the analysis comes from the COMPUSTAT files, from which I obtain
the accounting information of firms. In 1987, the FASB adopted the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard (SFAS) 95 entitled ”Statement of Cash Flows.” For this reason, I can
only construct the excess cash flow variables beginning in 1988; therefore, the data I use
covers the years between 1988 and 2010. I consider all cash prior to this date equal to zero.
The information for both the merger & acquisitions and the repurchases analyses comes from
Thompson’s Security Data Corporation (SDC) data sets. The information on stock returns
come from CRSP files. To create the normal cash holdings variable in my M&A analysis, I
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also require information on recession quarters, which I obtain from the National Bureau of
Economic Research, and the spread between AAA and Junk bonds, which I obtain from the
Federal Reserve.
The construction of the database follows standard practices in each of the branches of
the literature considered. I winsorize every variable in the analysis at the 1% level. I do
all the analyses by both including financial firms and utilities (SIC codes 6000-6999 and
4900-4999) and excluding them. For both analyses, I use only firms that I was able to merge
with the COMPUSTAT and CRSP files. For the M&A analysis, I only use mergers that are
greater than 1% of the acquiring firm’s total market value, I only use transactions labeled
”Acquisition of Assets” or ”Merger”, and I only use transactions in which the acquiring firm
had less than 50% of the equity of the target and was acquiring 100%.
1.5 Separating the Origin of Cash: Variable Construc-
tion and Analysis
To determine where the money firms are saving is coming from, I explore the details con-
tained in the cash flow statement of the firms. The cash flow statement is separated into
three different categories. The first item of the statement is “Cash Flows From Operat-
ing Activities”. This section includes net income and other items such as depreciation and
amortization, stock-based compensation and changes in operating working capital and non-
current assets and liabilities; this cash flow concerns cash flow from the everyday activities
of the firm. The second item is the “Cash Flow From Investing Activities”, which includes
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investments, capital expenditures, acquisitions of business and proceeds from the sale of as-
sets; this is cash flow from buying and selling assets. Finally, the third item of the cash flow
statement is the “Cash Flows From Financing Activities”, which includes any stock or debt
issuance or repurchase and proceeds and repayments of borrowing.
To determine the excess cash generated by each account, I utilize a few simple steps:
First, if all three cash flows were positive, then the excess cash generated by each account
is simply the cash flow. Second, if one or more of the cash flows is negative, I initially
use the cash that was accumulated from previous years in that account and only after that
do I use the positive cash generated by the other account(s). The idea behind this is to
try to recognize cash that was raised and never used. For example, if in one year I raised
money through an equity issuance but did not use the entire amount and repurchased shares
the next year, the “firs” money that should be used for the repurchase is the money raised
through the financing activity (the equity issuance). Third, if the savings in a specific ac-
count are insufficient to pay for the expenses in that year, I use money from other accounts
to fund the gap. Initially, I use cash flows generated by the positive accounts in the same
year. If the aggregate cash flow of that year was positive, the positive account(s) will con-
tribute proportionally to the size of their cash flow; an account with a higher cash flow will
contribute more. In this case, the excess cash flow from the accounts with positive cash flows
will be reduced and will eventually be whatever is left after covering the deficit of the other
account(s). Finally, if the aggregate cash flow of the three accounts was negative, I use the
available savings from the other accounts to fund the deficit in a proportional manner, as
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described above. Thus, even if an account had a positive cash flow, it will have a negative
surplus or excess flow. Once I have all the excess cash flows, I simply accumulate them over
the years, never letting them reach values below zero. Figure 1 presents a diagram with an
example of this process.
In addition, Table 1.1 details different examples of how I manipulate the original cash
flows to generate the excess cash and cumulative cash variables. The first line shows an
example in which there is no savings and the aggregate cash flow is negative; thus, the firm
spent more than what they had (there is an inconsistency in the reported numbers). In this
case, all the excess cash flows are zero and there is no cash accumulation for that year. In the
second line, we have a positive aggregate cash flow, indicating that the firm is increasing its
cash reserves. Note that both the operations and the finance cash flows are identical, for this
reason they contribute equally to fund the negative flow from the investment account. The
final excess cash flow from investment is zero, although the actual cash flow was negative.
Because there was no cash saved in this account, there cannot be an outflow from it this
year (a firm cannot have negative cash holdings by construction). The third line presents an
example of a negative cash flow in an account that previously had some cash accumulated
in it. Note that the ”first” cash I use to fund this account is always the savings from that
account. Finally, the fourth and the fifth year show examples in which the aggregate cash
flows were negative; in these cases, the firm is decreasing its cash holdings. In the fourth
year, all cash flows are negative or zero, and the firm uses the savings accumulated in the
Operations and Financing accounts to fund the negative flows on the investment accounts.
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This is accomplished by taking the money proportionally to the account size. In the fifth
year, only cash from the operations account is positive. I initially use the cash flow generated
that year to cover the deficit, then I use the accumulated cash left in the operations account
In summary, the variables created here capture the instances in which some cash is
generated in a given account but was not used. Facebook may become a good example
for this methodology in upcoming years. It had its IPO recently, but do not have a clear
destination for the cash they received. In the coming years, if all its investments are financed
by its cash flows, then this would indicate that it actually did not require the IPO in the
first place (at least not to raise capital for investments). Therefore, under this analysis, they
will have an excess amount of cash from financing activities.
All the results reported here use the data created using this methodology. However, I
tried 7 different constructions of the data set:
• Use all Cash (Cash Flow and Savings) from Financing Activities First
• Use all Cash (Cash Flow and Savings) from Operating Activities First
• All positive Cash Flows first, Savings From Financing second and other accounts sav-
ings last.
• All positive Cash Flows first, Savings From Operations second and other accounts
savings last.
• Old Cash First (Savings), New Cash second (flows)
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• Cash Flows Sequentially (Financing, Operations and Investing), then Cash Saved Se-
quentially (Financing, Operations and Investing)
The results remain qualitatively identical regardless of the way I construct the variables.
The results change with the construction by becoming stronger if the criteria for holding
cash from financing activities become tighter. For example, if I use all cash from financing
activities first, only firms that really held cash from financing activities will remain with
some amount of this cash on their books. The effects for this construction seem to be
stronger. Conversely, if I loosen the criteria for holding cash from financing activities (e.g.
by using cash from operations first), thereby increasing the number of firms with more cash
from financing activities, the results seem to weaken; however, they are still qualitatively the
same as the original construction.
1.6 Firms’ Cash Composition
The next step of the analysis is to explore the variables created. First, I investigate whether
their behavior is consistent with the aggregated variables (Cash Flow and Cash Holdings)
commonly used in the literature. I start by exploring basic summary statistics to see whether
the distribution, the mean and standard deviation of the separated variables present any odd
characteristic. Table 2.7 presents the main statistics for the variables created here and their
aggregate counterpart. The means, the distributions and the standard deviations of the
variables created are consistent with their aggregate counterparts. The majority of the cash
flow comes from operations, followed by financing activities and investments. The identical
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pattern is observed with the accumulated cash.
The evolution of the cash flows and the cash holdings of the firms also present an inter-
esting pattern. Figure 1.2 presents the evolution of the aggregate cash holdings of the US
firms, which is consistent with the findings of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Cash holdings
increased significantly after 2000, with public US corporations currently holding $ 2 trillion
, a statistic that has been widely explored by politicians and the popular media. Another
interesting fact is that cash from operations is responsible for most of the increase in cash
holdings. Cash from financing activities played a more significant role in the past. Prior to
2000, cash from financing activities represented approximately 1/3 of public corporations’
holdings. However, it is important to note that, even with the excessive amount of cash
currently available on the books of firms, corporations still rely on financing activities for
their cash management. In 2010, they held $ 250 billion in cash from financing activities.
According to Dittmar and Duchin (2012), the current increase in cash reserves is concen-
trated in the hands of a few firms that built their cash flow from a steady stream of profits.
For this reason, I also explore the cash variables separated by source normalized by total
assets. These findings are consistent with Dittmar and Duchin (2012), and show that the
average ratio of cash to total assets did not undergo a dramatic change in the past decade.
More importantly, on average, cash from financing activities represents a similar fraction of
total assets as cash from operations. Therefore, cash from operations is not the dominating
strategy for cash management. Different firms, of course, use different strategies to manage
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their cash.
Figure 1.4 performs a similar analysis but explores the flow variables, using the aggregate
cash flows coming from each account. The idea is twofold; first, each account’s contribution
to the increase in the cash holdings of the firms is tracked, and, second, the total movements
in the three accounts are shown to be consistent with the changes in total cash holdings.
Cash from operations was the most important source for cash accumulation in the past
decade, which is consistent with Figure 1.2. However, cash from financing activities had an
important role in the past and still represents a significant amount of firms’ current cash flows.
In my final analysis, I evaluate the persistency of different types of cash reserves. This is
important to mitigate concerns about the peculiarity of cash variables separated by source.
For instance, it may be of some concern that all cash from financing activities is earmarked
and would therefore be a temporary type of cash holdings. Firms will keep this cash on their
books for a short period until the investments they are earmarked for are realized. I use
the definition of excess cash holding 2 and persistency 3 found in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Stulz (2010). Figure 1.7 sshows the persistence of total cash holding and the cash variables
separated by source. The results for the total cash holdings are consistent with those found
in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010). In addition, cash from operations and cash from
financing activities have a similar persistence as total cash holdings. Therefore, firms that
2Cash/assets - Normal Cash/Assets Normal Cash/Assets is the industry median within 3x3 size and
market to book breakpoints, each year
3Percentage of firms in the top quartile in one year that continue to be in the top quartile in the following
years.
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have cash from financing activities are not more likely to use it first. Firms are indeed using
financing activities as part of their cash management strategy.
1.7 Easy come, Easy go: Cheap Savings and Bad Ex-
penses
In this section, I investigate whether the way the firms save their cash (either from financing
activities or operations) provides useful information about how the firm will spend it. I do
this by analyzing M&A and repurchase activities.
1.7.1 Mergers & Acquisitions Results
1.7.1.1 Probability of Bidding
According to Hypothesis 1, I expect that cash from financing activities do not provide the
identical financial freedom as cash from operations as discussed in the Hypotheses section,
cash from financial activities has more “strings attached”. Therefore, one should expect
that firms with a larger amount of cash from financing activities will not overspend even in
situations in which they have large amounts of cash. To analyze this, I employ a methodology
similar to the one developed by Harford (1999). The first step in his analysis is to create a
normal cash level for each firm in the data. Normal cash is defined as the industry median
predicted value of the following equation:
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Cash/Salesi,t = αi + β1NetCFO/Salesi,t + β2∆Riskpremiumt+1
+β3Recessiont + β4∆NetCFO/Salesi,t+1
+β5∆NetCFO/Salesi,t+2 + β6M/Bi,t−1
+β7CFOV ari + β8Sizei,t−1 + i,t (1.1)
Where NetCFO is operating income before depreciation (oibdp) minus interest expenses
(xint) minus taxes (txt) - ∆ Noncash working capital (act-lct-che). Risk premium is the
spread between Junk and AAA bond yields, Recession is a dummy variable indicating years
that the National Bureau of Economic Research has defined as a recession, M/B is the market
to book ratio, CFOV ar is the variance of firms cash flows and Size is log assets. I run this
regression with firm-fixed effects separately for each Fama-French industry classification.
Excess cash is defined as the cash holdings for the period minus the median of the predicted
value for the industry, normalized by total assets. To evaluate the relation between cash and
M&A, I start by looking at the probability of bidding using the following specification:
Acquisition(0/1)i,j,t = β1 ∗ CashDevi,j,t + CashDevi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t
+CashDevi,j,t ∗Xi,j,t +Xi,j,t + µt + δj (1.2)
Where Acquisition(0/1)i,j,t is a dummy variable indicating that firm i in industry j at
year t, bid on an acquisition. CashDevi,j,t is the deviation to the prediction of the cash
management model in Harford (1999). To explore the cross-sectional differences of the cash
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composition, I create different proxies for cash composition, represented in the equation by
CashCompositioni,j,t. One of the proxies is the percentage of cash coming from a given
source (either Operations or Financing), i.e., the fraction of cash accumulated that is com-
ing from a particular account. To help with the interpretation of the estimators, I also use a
dummy variable, that equals one if the percentage of cash from financing activities is in the
top quartile of the distribution. Alternatively, I also tested a dummy variable that equals
one when all of a firm’s cash, comes from operating activities. Xi, j, t is a set of controls
that include firm size, age, leverage, profitability, market-to-book-ratio, Net Working Capi-
tal, Sales Growth, Price-to-Earnings and previous year abnormal stock returns. Note that I
also include the controls interacted by the cash deviation variable to ensure that the impact
I am measuring is not captured by another variable previously available in the dataset.
Table 1.3 presents the results for the probability of bidding on an acquisition target.
Column (1) presents the baseline results found in Harford (1999) showing that firms with
larger amounts of cash are more likely to bid. Columns (2)-(4) show the results for the
interaction term of cash deviation and different proxies for cash holdings from financing ac-
tivities. Column (2) uses the fraction of the total cumulative cash from financing activities.
Column (3) and (4) uses a dummy variable that equals one when the firm’s percentage of
cash from financing activities is in the top quartile of its distribution. The different proxies
show essentially identical results. Firms with large cash holdings and firms holding cash
from financing activities are less likely to bid on an acquisition than similar firms with large
cash holdings from operations. The results are robust to the inclusion of all the controls,
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interacted controls and firm-fixed effects. In addition, Column (5) and (6) shows the results
for the dummy indicating that all the firm’s cash came from operations. These firms are
more likely to bid; in fact, firms with larger amounts of cash from operations are driving
most of the results previously found in the literature that firms with more cash are more
likely to bid. The findings are also robust to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects.
The results are consistent with the first hypothesis. Financing cash does not provide the
financial permissiveness provided by cash from operations. The results show that firms with
financing cash hold that cash closer and more dearly; managers are not making acquisitions
simply because they have more cash on their books. In addition, I use the excess cash
variables found in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo,
and Stulz (2010) with qualitatively identical results.
1.7.1.2 Announcement Returns
I now turn to the cross-sectional differences in these performances when firms bid on an
acquisition. For this purpose, I employ a cross-sectional analysis of the three-day announce-
ment abnormal returns (-1,0,1) of the bidding firms. The specification used is as follows:
CAR(−1, 1)i,j = β1 ∗ CashDevi,j,t + CashDevi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t
+CashDevi,j,t ∗Xi,j,t +Xi,j,t + µt + δj (1.3)
The proxies for cash composition are identical to those used in the previous section. Note
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that all the regressions are controlled for year and industry-fixed effects as indicated by µt
and δj. The controls are similar to the ones found in the previous specification, but I also
add a dummy for “all cash” acquisitions and the cumulative return for the 2 years prior to
the acquisition.
Table 1.4 shows the results of a cross-sectional analysis. Column (1) presents the result
found in Harford (1999) that firms with large cash reserves will have a worse announcement
performance than the average firm. For columns (2)-(6), I employ the identical proxies for
the composition of cash holdings used in the previous section. I find that firms with large
cash reserves from financing activities do not destroy value when they do an acquisition.
As with the results for probability of bidding, all the bad results found for firms with large
cash holdings apply only to firms with a larger fraction of cash from operations. Column (6)
shows that the interaction with the dummy indicating that all cash came from operations can
explain all the negative variation previously associated with firms with large cash reserves
(from any source).
The results are once more consistent with my first hypothesis. However, these results
provide the first insight into the second hypothesis. Firms with more cash from operating
activities are engaging in more acquisitions (which would sustain an empire-building hy-
pothesis), and, in addition, they are more likely to choose a bad acquisition. To make this
choice rational, the manager’s private benefit of this single transaction must be higher than
the benefits of a different profitable acquisition and all the downside risk of a bad acquisi-
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tion must be minimized (lower bonus, less-desirable stock options, employment uncertainty).
This suggests that these managers might be doing something wrong unintentionally. I argue
that one possible explanation for this is that managers using cash from financing activities
will use the correct cost of capital (or opportunity cost of cash) to evaluate their project
because this type of cash is the most expensive cash a firm can have, and they will therefore
only make economically prudent and profitable acquisitions.
1.7.2 Stock Repurchase Results
The results from the previous section offer some evidence that firms that obtain their money
from financing activities seem to behave differently than firms that obtain the majority of
their cash from operations. Firms obtaining cash through financing activities are less likely
to bid, indicating that cash from financing activities does not provide the financial slack
commonly observed in the previous literature. These firms also seem to be making better
project evaluations, which may indicate that they have a better perception of their cost of
capital. To extend this analysis, I move to the second field of the literature that ties in
to this paper, Stock Repurchase Analysis. In his 2012 letter to the Berkshire Hathaway
shareholder, Warren Buffet argued favorably for stock repurchases when firm liquidity needs
are satisfied and the management team is certain that the firm’s stock is undervalued 4. In
this section I explore how analyzing the different ways of obtaining cash may provide useful
information about how effectively the firms will conduct stock repurchases.
4The full quote is: “Charlie and I favor repurchases when two conditions are met: first, a company has
ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its business; second, its stock is selling at
a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business value, conservatively calculated.” and can be found
at: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2011ltr.pdf, page 6
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1.7.2.1 Announcement Returns
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with more cash from financing activities have a better un-
derstanding about the opportunity costs of the firm’s cash and that these firms will therefore
perform better in their repurchase announcement returns because their superior understand-
ing of their cost of capital will make them more sensitive to the moments when they are un-
dervalued. The first step I take to analyze this is to determine whether firms with different
cash savings profiles actually perform differently when they conducting share repurchases. I
use a similar specification as the one found in Grullon and Michaely (2004). I employ the
cross-sectional analysis of the three-day announcement returns:
CAR(−1, 1)i,j = β1 ∗ Cashi,j,t + Cashi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t
+Cashi,j,t ∗Xi,j,t +Xi,j,t + µt + δj (1.4)
Where Cashi,j,t is the firm’s total cash and cash equivalents normalized by assets, the
variables labeled CashCompositioni,j,t are the same proxies used previously, and Xi,j,t is
a set of controls that follow Grullon and Michaely (2004) and include a firm’s age, size,
market-to-book, leverage, changes in returns to assets and percentage of shares announced
to be repurchased.
Table 1.5 presents the results of the cross-section analysis of the announcement returns.
Column (1) presents the results found in Grullon and Michaely (2004)), where they find that
firms with larger cash reserves present higher announcement returns for share repurchases.
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Columns (2)-(4) show that this result is mainly driven by firms with more cash from financ-
ing activities. Column (5) shows that firms with more cash from operations actually present
negative announcement returns for share repurchases
The results in table 1.4 provide additional evidence for my second hypothesis. If agency
problems or lack of monitoring/advising was so important, investors should not be so “un-
happy” with the news that firms are returning their money to investors. In addition, the
results for firms with more cash from financing activities show that there is a complex ex-
planation for what is happening. If we were simply dividing firms into “good” and “bad”
firms, investors should not be so “happy” that the good firms are returning their cash. In
the next section, I will explore one possible explanation for the difference observed here.
1.7.2.2 Overvaluation and the Probability of Stock Repurchase
According to Grullon and Michaely (2004), the explanation for the positive announcement
returns to share repurchases is a result of agency problems that cash holdings may generate,
i.e., investors value the cash outside the firm more than inside it. However, this explanation
is not consistent with my previous findings. Firms with more cash from financing activities
have lower levels of agency conflict and yet present positive announcement returns to their
share repurchases. Firms with more cash from operations are more prone to have agency
conflicts because the manager has discretion to decide where the money is going.
An alternative explanation, consistent with my previous findings, is that the positive
29
result found for stock repurchase announcements for firms with large cash holdings from
financing is caused simply by better market timing. Firms with more cash from financ-
ing activities may be deciding the correct time to invest in a repurchase. To do investi-
gate this possibility, I employ the methodology developed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan (2005). In their paper, they find that misvaluation drives M&A activity. To
measure overvaluation, they start with the simple idea that, if we had the correct value of
the firm, we could decompose the market-to-book ratio as follows
Market− to−Book ≡Market− to− V alue× V alue− To−Book (1.5)
Mathematically, we would have:
log(M/B) = log(M)− log(B) ≡ m− b
m− b ≡ (m− v) + (v − b) (1.6)
Using this equivalence, they decompose the firm market-to-book ratio into the following
three components:
mi,t − bi,t = mi,t − υ(θi,t;αj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm
+ υ(θi,t;αj,t)− υ(θi,t; α¯j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sector
+ υ(θi,t; α¯j)− bi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Long−Run
(1.7)
Where υ(θi,t;αj,t) is estimated using the following specification:
mi,t = α0,j,t + β1,j,tbi,t + β2,j,tln(NI)
+
i,t + β3,j,tI<0ln(NI)
+
i,t + β4,j,tLEVi,t + ij, t (1.8)
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whereNI+ is the absolute value of net income and I<0ln(NI)
+
i,t is an indicator function for
negative net income observations. As the notation indicates, I run this regression separately
for each Fama French industry classification and year. The parameters estimated therefore
vary both by industry and year.
The difference between the firm’s current market value and the estimated intrinsic value
is: mi,t − υ(θi,t;αj,t). This difference measures the idiosyncratic firm’s misvaluations; thus,
υ(θi,t;αj,t)−υ(θi,t; α¯j) is the difference between the estimated value with current parameters
and an estimated value using average parameters for a particular industry. The value esti-
mated using the industry parameters captures the long-term estimated value for the firm;
this is also called the time-series sector error, and upsilon(θi,t; α¯j)− bi,t is called the long-run
error. It is the deviation of the long-term estimated value from the firm’s book value using.
This difference measures long-run misvaluations. These variables will provide proxies for
different types of misvaluations that should be considered by the manager when considering
a share repurchase.
To determine whether firms with more cash from financing activities are timing the
market better, I evaluate whether these firms are more likely to do a repurchase when they
are undervalued based on the proxies created by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan
(2005). I run a separate probit regression of the probability of announcing a repurchase on
each one of the valuation error variables, using the following specification:
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Repurchase(0/1)i,j,t = βm ∗ V aluation Errori,j,t,m
+V aluation Errori,j,t,m ∗HighCashi,j,t
+V aluation Errori,j,t,m ∗HighCashi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t
+Xi,j,t + µt + δj + θi (1.9)
where V aluation Error is one of the three proxies for misvaluation from Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), HighCash is a dummy indicating that the firm is in
the top quartile of the cash distribution, and CashCompositioni,j,t are the proxies for cash
composition used in the other sections of the paper.
Table 1.6 shows the results for the undervaluation analysis, divided into 3 panels. Each
panel is the analysis of one of the measures of misvaluation. Panel A shows the results for
the firms’ specific error. This measure captures idiosyncratic errors in the firm’s valuation.
Column (1) shows that firms in general time the market and are less likely to do a repurchase
when they are overvalued 6. Column (3), shows that the results found in column (1) are
primarily driven by firms with more cash from financing activities. Firms with more cash
from operations are actually more likely to do a repurchase when they are overvalued (as
shown in Column (6)). The results in Panel B and Panel C confirm that firms with more
cash from financing activities time the market better and that firms with more cash from
operations are worse, regardless of the measure we are using for overvaluation.
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These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2, once again firms with more cash from
operating activities are systematically choosing bad investments. In this case, they are
making incorrect bets on their own value. For the repurchases, we can exclude the possibility
of private benefit, and therefore the manager must be looking simply for the best opportunity
to invest this cash. These managers must systematically be making mistakes that managers
of firms with more cash from financing activities do not make. I argue that the reason for
this that that they have an incorrect perception of the opportunity costs of cash. In the next
section, I will provide further evidence of this behavior.
1.7.3 Returns on Investments
The existing literature about cash reserves treats cash holdings as free cash flow. Free cash
flow gives the manager freedom to act in his own interests that will drive him to make bad
investment decisions for the firm. Throughout this paper, I argue that this explanation may
be incomplete. Even if they are seeking private benefits, managers should be interested in
profitable projects because they will increase their salary and their job security. Therefore,
there must be an additional explanation for this behavior. My results for share repurchases
reinforces the need for this explanation because these managers are making a bad investment
that is not associated with empire building or private benefit.
I argue that the fact that cash from operations has no direct costs and also has low
returns misleads these managers about the actual opportunity costs of cash. Managers may
be thinking that employing this cash in a low return investment should be sufficient to guar-
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antee a better use of this cash because it is returning the firm close to nothing. Conversely,
cash from financing activities has a direct cost that reminds the manager of the actual op-
portunity costs of the cash they are holding. Another way to remind the manager about this
opportunity cost of cash is a higher return on their current cash investments. The manager
would be more careful in choosing another investment, because that investment would have
a higher hurdle to be considered a better use of the cash.
To explore this, I analyze the cross-sectional differences in the M&A activities of firms
with different returns on their short-term investments. The returns on short-term invest-
ments are the firm’s interest income divided by total short-term investments. In this section,
I use a derivation of the specification used in the M&A section of this paper:
Acquisition(0/1) = β1 ∗ CashDevi,j,t + CashDevi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t (1.10)
+CashDevi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t ∗Ret.on.Investi,j,t
+Xi,j,t + µt + δj
And
CAR(−1, 1)i,j = β1 ∗ CashDevi,j,t + CashDevi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t (1.11)
+CashDevi,j,t ∗ CashCompositioni,j,t ∗Ret.on.Investi,j,t
+Xi,j,t + µt + δj
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where Ret.on.Investi,j,t iis the interest income divided by total short-term investments.
All other variables are identical to the variables used in the M&A analysis.
Table 1.7 presents the results of the triple interaction regressions using returns on short-
term investments. Panel A shows the results of the probit regressions of the probability of
bidding on an acquisition. When firms have a higher return on their investment, they are
less likely to bid on an acquisition. In addition, Panel B shows that they also perform better
on their acquisitions, and have higher announcement returns.
The results are consistent with hypothesis 2. When the direct opportunity costs of cash
are higher, managers are more careful in their spending. High returns on cash investments
might be forcing them to pay more careful attention to their costs of capital. Consequently,
they evaluate their investments better. It is important to note that these results are also
consistent with the advising hypothesis. Higher returns on investment might indicate a closer
relationship with the firm’s bank and investors, which might provide the firm with better
advice about its investments.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper, I investigate how firms use different sources to build their cash reserves.
Furthermore, I analyze whether the composition of the cash holdings provides meaningful
information about the way the firm will spend its money. I develop a methodology to capture
the source of cash and classify firms based on the different percentages of cash from financing
or operating activities to analyze their subsequent expenditures on M&A activity and share
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repurchases.
I find that the expenditure behavior of firms with a higher fraction of their cash coming
from financing activities diverge significantly from the behavior of firms in general with large
cash holdings previously found in the literature. The former firms are not more likely to
bid on an acquisition simply because they have more cash, and when they bid they do not
destroy value. In addition, firms with high percentages of cash from financing activities also
perform better in their stock repurchases. This effect seem to come from better timing in the
market because these firms are more likely to make a repurchase when they are undervalued.
Finally, I find suggestive evidence that a better understanding of the costs of capital is what
drives these results and find that firms with more cash from operations actually do better
when the returns to their current cash investments are higher.
The results in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that more cash can increase
agency problems in a firm, but show that not all cash is identical; cash from financing activ-
ities may actually have disciplinary effects. The disciplinary effect could come in the form of
closer monitoring/advising by investors because the cash the firm is hoarding came directly
from their pockets. In addition, this paper suggests that the monitoring hypothesis might
be incomplete because management interests (higher salary, higher tenure, etc.) may be
aligned with the performance of the firm, even though the manager has investment discre-
tion. I argue that the fact that cash from operations has no direct cost and expectations of
low returns mislead managers with respect to the true opportunity cost of cash. Cash from
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financing activities may provide the firm with a better picture of the opportunity costs of
cash; because cash from financing activities is the most expensive cash the firm will hold,
the management team will have a clear understanding of how much the new project must
return for it to be worth investing. Consequently, although these firms may have large cash
holdings, they will not engage in overspending.
Finally, this study provides some guidance about what not to expect from the accumu-
lation of corporate cash holdings in recent years. The spike in cash holdings has spawned
journalists, politicians and even academics to make predictions about merger waves and re-
purchase waves. This paper finds evidence that cash holdings by themselves do not provide
meaningful information to make such predictions. Depending on the firm’s cash holding
composition, the results may actually go in either direction.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Generating Excess Cash Flow Variables Separated by Source
Figure 1.1 presents the methodology employed to obtain excess cash flows generated by each ac-
count. Cash Flow from operating activities is the total Cash flow coming from Operations obtained
directly from COMPUSTAT. Similarly, Cash Flow from Financing and Investment Activities are
the total cash flows from financing and investment activities, respectively. Cash from Operating, Fi-
nancing, and Investment Activities is the accumulated cash from the Excess Cash Flows generated
by this methodology.
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Figure 1.2: Average Cash Holding Separated by Category
Figure 1.2 presents aggregate cumulative cash separated according to its source. Agg. Op. Cumu-
lative Cash is cash that was accumulated from the excess cash flows from operations. Similarly,
Agg. Fin. Cumulative Cash and Agg. Ivn. Cumulative Cash are the cumulative surplus from the
Cash Flows from Financing and Investing activities, respectively.
Take away: Cash from Operations Represents the majority of the cash holdings of firms. However,
Cash from financing activities still represents a significant amount of the cash holdings of US
corporations; in 2010, the firms in the dataset were holding approximately 250 billion dollars in
cash from financing activities.
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Figure 1.3: Average Cash Holdings Separated by Source Divided by Total Assets
Figure 1.3 presents average cash by source normalized by total assets. Avg. Cash over Assets is
the total cash holdings of the firm divided by total assets. Similarly Avg. Op. Cash over Assets,
Avg. Fin. Cash over Assets and Avg. Inv. Cash over Assets are the total cash accumulated from
operating, financing and Investing activities, respectively, divided by total assets.
Take away: The results here show that cash is concentrated in the hands of a few firms (consistent
with Dittmar and Duchin (2012)) and that, on average, cash from financing activities actually
represents a similar fraction of the firm’s cash holdings as cash from operations.
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Figure 1.4: Aggregate Excess Cash Flow Separated by Category
Figure 1.4 presents the total excess cash flow separated by the source of cash. Total Change in
Cash is the COMPUSTAT variable for the changes in cash in the firm’s balance sheet. Total Excess
Op. CF, Total Excess Fin. CF and Total Excess Inv. CF represent the break down of the total
changes into the three categories from the cash flow statement.
Take away: The results show that the dataset created here is consistent with the changes in cash
from COMPUSTAT. In addition, I draw similar conclusions as from Figure 1. Cash from financing
activities was a more important part of the changes in the cash holdings of the firm, and still
represents a significant amount of the changes in the cash holdings of firms. In 2009, 28 billion
dollars of the increase in cash holdings came from cash from financing activities.
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Figure 1.5: Avg. Fraction of Cash From Financing Activities by Industry
Figure 1.5 presents the average fraction of cash from financing activities separated by the Fama and
French industry classification. The fraction of cash from financing activities of a firm is determined
by the accumulated cash from financing activities divided by the total accumulated cash.
Take away: The results show that most industries present a similar average fraction of cash from
financing activities. Business Equipments (Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment) and
Health (Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs) rely more heavily on financing activities to
built their cash reserve.
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Figure 1.6: Avg. Fraction of Cash From Financing Activities by Age
Figure 1.6 presents the average fraction of cash from financing activities separated by firm age.
The fraction of cash from financing activities of a firm is determined by the accumulated cash from
financing activities divided by the total accumulated cash.
Take away: Firms rely more heavily on financing activities to build their cash reserves in the
beginning of their lives. This cash is replaced by cash from operations as they age. Nevertheless,
they still keep a substantial amount of cash from financing activities at all stages of the firm’s life.
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Figure 1.7: Cash Holding Persistence Separated by Source
Figure 1.7 presents the persistence of total excess cash holdings, excess cash holdings from opera-
tions, and excess cash holdings from financing activities. The graph depicts the percentage of the
firms that were in the top 4th quartile of the Excess Cash holdings for one year, that continued to
be in this group for the following years. Excess Cash holdings is defined by Deangelo, Deangelo and
Stulz (2010), which is the industry median each year of a group based on size and market-to-book
breakpoints.
Take away: Cash from financing activities is not a transitory holding that adjusts quickly. Firms
hold cash from financing activities for the same amount of time they hold cash from operations and
the average cash and cash equivalents.
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Figure 1.8: Composition of Cash From Financing Activities Over The Years
Figure 1.8 presents the composition of the cash from financing activities over the years, separating
it by wether it came from debt, equity or other financing activity. Following McKeon (2013) I also
separate equity issuances by wether they were initiated by the firm or by investors.
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Take away: During the 1970’s and the 1980’s most of the cash from financing activities was coming
from debt. Consistent with McLean (2011), after the 1990’s cash from equity increase its share and
it currently represents the majority of the cash from financing activities. Consistent with McKeon
(2013) investor initiated equity issuance is increasing its share over the years.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Variable Construction
Table 1.1 presents a hypothetical example of how firm’s excess cash flow and total cash holdings separated
by source are created from the COMPUSTAT variables. CF Op, CF Fin, CF Inv are the COMPUSTAT
variables: Net Cash provided (used) in operating activities, investing activities and financing activities,
respectively. Op Def, Fin Def Inv Def are the deficit generated by each individual account when the cash
flow was negative and there was no accumulated cash in that account to cover it. Ex Op CF, Ex Fin CF
and Ex Inv CF are the flow variables used in the paper. They determine the excess cash provided (used) in
each account. Cum Op, Cum Fin, Cum Inv are the cumulative sum of the flow variables, restricting them
to be always positive.
YearCF OpCF FinCF InvOp Def Fin Def Inv Def Ex Op CF Ex Fin CF Ex Inv CF Cum OpCum FinCum Inv
1 100 100 -200 0 0 -200 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 100 100 -100 0 0 -100 50 50 0 0 0 0
3 100 -30 30 0 0 0 100 -30 30 50 50 0
4 0 0 -40 0 0 -10 -8.82 -1.18 -30 150 20 30
5 20 -28.82 -30 0 -10 -30 -20 -18.82 0 141.18 18.82 0
6 121.18 0 0
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Table 2.7 presents the summary statistics for the cash variables created in this paper. Cash Holdings is
the total cash the firm currently holds in its books from Compustat. Op. Cash Holdings, Fin. Cash
Holdings, Inv. Cash Holding are the cash holdings coming from Operations, Financing and Investment
activity respectively created for this paper, scaled by total assets. The categories are created based on the
origin of the cash surplus. Changes in Cash is the total changes in cash, calculated using current levels of
cash minus the previous year’s cash levels. Op. Cash Surplus, Fin. Cash Surplus and Inv. Cash Surplus are
the cash surplus generated by Operations, Financing and Investment activities respectively, scaled by total
assets. The construction of these variables is explained in details in section 1.5.
Variable mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile SD N
Cash Holdings 117.4 0.658 5.087 30.07 806.6 167991
Op. Cash Holdings 77.77 0 0.279 9.921 598.9 165108
Fin. Cash Holdings 16.31 0 0.0129 3.492 174.5 165104
Inv. Cash Holding 5.412 0 0 0 142.8 164759
Changes in Cash 16.91 -2.257 0.0270 5.855 411.1 152797
Op. Cash Surplus 12.17 0 0 1.488 242.8 165108
Fin. Cash Surplus 1.924 -0.0500 0 0.262 108.6 165104
Inv. Cash Surplus 0.704 0 0 0 128.8 164759
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Table 1.3: Predicting M&A bidders
Table 1.3 reports the results of the regressions of probability of bidding for an acquisition target. Panel
A presents the results of probit regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one
when the firm has bid to acquire another firm in a given year and zero otherwise. CashDev is the cash
deviation from the cash management model developed by Harford (1999). PctF inCash is the percentage
of total cash coming from financing and activities. HighFinCash is a dummy indicating that that the
firm’s percentage of cash from financing activities are in the top quartile of the distribution. OnlyOpCash
is a dummy indicating that all the firm’s current cash holdings came from operations. The other controls
are listed in section 2.6 and their construction details are available in the variable appendix. The internet
appendix presents the full version of this table.
Dependent Variable: Acquisition(0/1)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Probit Regressions
CashDev 0.285*** 0.332*** 0.295*** 0.048 0.145** -0.214
(7.438) (2.922) (3.226) (0.263) (2.064) (-1.427)
CashDev ∗ PctF inCash -0.235***
(-3.312)
CashDev ∗HighFinCash -0.217*** -0.315**
(-3.462) (-2.380)
CashDev ∗OnlyOpCash 0.115** 0.472**
(2.048) (2.451)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-effect No Yes Yes No Yes No
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed-effect No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 82,960 50,161 50,161 20,901 50,161 20,901
Pseudo R2 0.0877 0.057 0.058 0.064 0.058 0.063
Panel B: Marginal Effects
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂CashDev 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.025***
(8.072) (4.786) (5.055)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂(CashDev∗HighFinPct) -0.029***
(-2.984)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂(CashDev∗OnlyOpCash) 0.023***
(2.946)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂CashDev|HighFinPct=0 0.046***
(4.936)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂CashDev|HighFinPct=1 0.011***
(3.082)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂CashDev|OnlyOpCash=0 0.026***
(5.123)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂CashDev|OnlyOpCash=1 0.044***
(6.945)
Joint Test 0.0137 0.0347 0.0481 -0.0174
T-Stat (2.912) (3.666) (6.817) (-2.556)
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Take away: Firms that have cash from financing activities are less likely to
bid even with large amounts of cash on their books.
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Table 1.4: Announcement Returns
Table 1.4 reports the results of cross-section regressions in which the dependent variable is the 3-day cumula-
tive return around an announcement of M&A activity (-1,0,1). CashDev is the cash deviation from the cash
management model from Harford (1999). PctF inCash and PctOpCash are the percentage of cash coming
from financing and operational activities. HasFinCash is a dummy indicating that the firm’s holdings of
cash from financing activities are greater than zero. HighFinCash is a dummy indicating that that the
firm’s percentage of cash from financing activities are in the top quartile of the distribution. The other
controls are listed in section 2.6 and their construction details are available in the variable appendix. The
internet appendix presents the full version of this table.
Dependent Variable: Car(−1, 1)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CashDev -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.036*** -0.016** -0.013** -0.010
(-9.122) (-2.911) (-3.669) (-2.449) (-1.963) (-1.615)
CashDev ∗ PctF inCash 0.019**
(2.474)
CashDev ∗HasFinCash 0.027***
(3.516)
CashDev ∗HighFinCash 0.020***
(3.476)
CashDev ∗ PctOpCash -0.016*
(-1.685)
CashDev ∗OnlyOpCash -0.026***
(-2.780)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,630 7,148 7,148 7,676 7,148 7,148
R-squared 0.053 0.065 0.065 0.069 0.064 0.042
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Take away: Firms that have cash from financing activities do not destroy value
when making acquisitions. The agency problems associated with large cash
holdings only apply to firms holding large amounts of cash from operations.
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Table 1.5: Repurchases Announcement Returns
Tables 1.5 reports the regressions of 3-day cumulative returns around the announcement of a stock repurchase
based on firms’ characteristics. I Follow Grullon and Michaely (2004) for the variable construction. CAR
is the cumulative return for the 3 days surrounding the announcement (-1,0,1). All dependent variables are
deflated by total assets. Ci,t is cash and cash equivalents. PctF inCashi,t is the percentage of cash holdings
from financing activities. HasFinCashi,t is a dummy indicating that the firm has some cash from financing
activities. HighFinCashi,t is a dummy indicating that the percentage of cash the firm is holding is in the
top quartile of its distribution. PctOpCash is the percentage cash holdings from operations. OnlyOpCash
is a dummy indicating that the firm only has cash from operations. The other controls are listed in section
2.6 and their construction details are available in the variable appendix. The internet appendix presents the
full version of this table.
Panel A: All Firms
Dependent Variable: CAR(−1, 1)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ci,t 0.020*** -0.056*** -0.043** -0.050*** -0.019 -0.029*
(2.797) (-3.015) (-2.326) (-3.118) (-1.186) (-1.903)
Ci,t ∗ PctF inCash 0.046**
(2.453)
Ci,t ∗HasFinCash 0.020
(1.385)
Ci,t ∗HighFinCash 0.046***
(3.079)
Ci,t ∗ PctOpCash -0.044**
(-2.541)
Ci,t ∗OnlyOpCash 0.000
(0.024)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,837 3,562 3,837 3,837 3,562 3,562
R-squared 0.036 0.105 0.104 0.106 0.105 0.103
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Take away: Firms with more cash from financing activities present positive
announcement returns to their share repurchases. Firms with more cash
from operations actually present negative returns (contrary to the existing
literature)
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Table 1.6: Probability of Repurchase
Table 1.6 reports probit regressions and logit regressions with firm fixed effects of a dummy indicating the firm had a repurchase
that year on measures of overvaluation and interaction terms with our variables of interest. I follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2005) to construct the overvaluation variables. Firm− Specificerror is the deviation of market value from
the estimated intrinsic value. T ime− SeriesError is the deviation of the estimated intrinsic value from the average estimated
value (which is called Long-run Value). Long− runV aluetoBook is the deviation of the Long-run Value from the current book
value. High Cash is a dummy variable indicating that the firm year is in the top quartile of the cash holding distribution of
its industry. PctCFin. indicates the percentage of the current cash holdings that come from financing activities. Similarly,
PctCOp. indicates the percentage that come from Operations. The other controls are listed in section 2.6 and their construction
details are available in the variable appendix. The internet appendix presents the full version of this table.
Dependent Variable: Repurchase(0 1)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Firm-Specific Error
Firm-Specific Error -0.043*** -0.043** -0.018 -0.066 -0.020 -0.062
(-2.812) (-2.560) (-0.961) (-1.193) (-1.060) (-1.115)
Firm-Specifi Error*HighCash -0.013 0.047 0.013 -0.092* -0.087
(-0.418) (0.978) (0.095) (-1.915) (-0.620)
Firm-Specifi Error*HighCash*PctCFin. -0.161** -0.010
(-2.151) (-0.044)
Firm-Specifi Error*HighCash*PctCOp. 0.152* 0.177
(1.803) (0.773)
Observations 54,799 54,855 48,571 15,144 48,571 15,144
Pseudo R2 0.0553 0.0417 0.0562 0.0543 0.0571 0.0553
Panel B: Time-Series Error
Time-Series Error -0.060 0.221*** -0.038 -0.292** -0.034 -0.286**
(-1.428) (5.286) (-0.753) (-2.300) (-0.681) (-2.248)
Time-Series Error*HighCash -0.401*** -0.091 -0.320 -0.507*** -1.215***
(-4.451) (-0.714) (-1.010) (-3.477) (-3.576)
Time-Series Error*HighCash*PctCFin. -0.466** -1.015*
(-2.084) (-1.897)
Firm-Specifi Error*HighCash*PctCOp. 0.516** 1.104**
(2.231) (1.968)
Observations 54,799 54,855 48,571 15,144 48,571 15,144
Pseudo R2 0.0550 0.0426 0.0567 0.0569 0.0576 0.0578
Panel C: Long-run Value to Book
Long-run Value to Book 0.061** -0.079*** 0.089*** 0.286*** 0.086*** 0.290***
(2.309) (-3.035) (2.860) (3.452) (2.767) (3.497)
Long-run Value to book*HighCash 0.024 -0.003 0.214 -0.145** -0.300
(0.396) (-0.047) (1.104) (-1.966) (-1.211)
Long-run Value to book*HighCash*PctCFin. -0.140* -0.668*
(-1.903) (-1.686)
Long-run Value to book*HighCash*PctCOp. 0.185** 0.610
(2.504) (1.642)
Observations 54,799 54,855 48,571 15,144 48,571 15,144
Pseudo R2 0.0552 0.0418 0.0565 0.0559 0.0574 0.0567
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes No Yes
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Take away: The positive announcement returns to their share repurchases are a result of timing the market
better. The bad results of firms with large cash holdings from operations is because of poor timing.
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Table 1.7: Returns on Cash
Table 1.7 reports the results of the regressions found on tables 1.3 and 1.4 adding an interaction with the
returns on cash. Panel A reports the results of probit regressions on the probability of bidding. Panel B
reports the 3-day announcement returns cross-section regressions. Ret. on Cash is Interest and Related
income normalized by total assets. The other controls are listed in section 2.6 and their construction details
are available in the variable appendix.
Panel A: Panel B:
Prob. of Bidding Ret. on M&A
Dep. Var: Acq (0 1) Dep. Var.: CAR(-1,1)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
CashDev 0.102*** 0.106*** 0.002 0.003
(2.690) (2.584) (0.239) (0.634)
CashDev ∗ PctOpCash 0.611*** 0.523*** -0.031* -0.031***
(6.810) (6.169) (-1.741) (-2.613)
CashDev ∗ PctOpCash ∗Ret. on Invest. -1.161*** -1.189*** 0.056** 0.056***
(-3.721) (-3.757) (2.392) (2.958)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 31,681 31,681 2,337 2,337
Pseudo R2 0.0521 0.0590 R2 0.034 0.038
Marginal Effects For Probit Model
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂CashDev 0.014*** 0.014***
(2.699) (2.599)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂(CashDev∗PctOp.Cash) 0.084*** 0.071***
(7.004) (6.292)
∂ Pr(Acq)/∂(CashDev∗PctOp.Cash∗Ret. on Invest.) -0.159*** -0.162***
(-3.726) (-3.759)
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Take away: When returns on their short-term investments are higher, firms with
more cash from operations perform better on their M&A activities
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Variable Description Calculation using Original Data
Set variable
Panel A: Excess Cash Flows Data Set
CashDev Excess Cash calculated using the Harford’s
(1999) methodology
Details on subsection A.1 of sec-
tion VII
PctF inCash Percentage of Cash coming from Financing ac-
tivities
CashfromFin/(CashFromFin+
CashFromOp+CashfromInv)
PctOpCash Percentage of Cash coming from Operations CashfromOp/(CashFromFin+
CashFromOp+CashfromInv)
HasFinCash Dummy Variable equals 1 when
PctF inCash > 0
HighFinCash Dummy Variable equals 1 when PctF inCash
is in top quartile
OnlyOpCash Dummy Variable equals 1 when PctOpCash
equals 1
PanelB: COMPUSTAT
CashHoldings Total Cash Holdings che
ChangesinCash Changes in Total Cash Holdings che− chet−1
NetWorkingCapital Non-Cash Net Working Capital (act− lct− che)/at
SaleGrowth Sales Growth (salet − salet−1)/salet−1
Leverage Market Leverage (dlc+ dltt)/(prccf ∗ csho)
Market− to− book Market to Book Ratio (prccf ∗ csho)/(at− lt−mib)
Price− to− Earnings Price to Earnings Ratio prccf/epspi
Size Firm’s size log(at)
Ab.Return 12 month buy and hold return using the 5X5
Fama-French size and MB Portifolio
12 month buys and hold return -
12 month buy and hold return of
FF 25 portifolio
Profitability Income plus depreciation over total assets (ib+ dp)/at
Age Number of years after IPO
ReturnonAssets Returns on Assets ib/at
Ret.OnInvest Interest income over short term investments idit/ivst
Panel C: SDC
PSOUGHT Percentage of shares announced to be repur-
chased
pctshsauthlatestauthdate/100
AllCash All Cash Merger & Acquisition pctcash = 100
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Chapter 2
Back in Style: Contrasts in Style and
CEO Impact on Corporate Policy
2.1 Introduction
The growth in CEO compensation has been in the center of the corporate finance literature
1. The financial crisis stimulated this discussion and brought it to the newspapers’ front
page. After the financial crisis, CEO costs and benefits were extensively discussed, with no
definitive answer. Important questions related to the relevance of CEOs remain unanswered:
Are there significant differences between the ways CEOs run the firms? Do these differences
provide a competitive edge for the firm? Would the firm’s corporate policies be significantly
different if another, and perhaps less expensive, CEO was in office?
Many studies have used different methods to determine the CEO’s impact on performance
and corporate policies. In their seminal paper, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use an F-test
on a set of CEO fixed effects calculated using a panel of executives in order to measure this
impact. They found that the CEOs preferences (style), can explain the heterogeneity of the
1see for example Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), Kaplan (2008) and Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004)
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different firm’s corporate policies (investment, financial, and organizational). Other papers
have found that CEO style affects the firm’s accounting Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010)
and tax practices Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), CEO compensation Graham, Li,
and Qiu (2012), leverage choice Frank and Goyal (2007) and performance volatility Adams,
Almeida, and Ferreira (2005).
In a recent paper, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) challenge the previous results in the
literature, criticizing the use of F-tests on three different grounds: (1) biases, (2) serial cor-
relation and (3) warning about the validity of the F-test in panel data with an exploding
N. In their paper found on Wooldridge (2010), they propose restricting the analysis to a
sub-sample of turnovers considered exogenous to solve the bias problem and suggest a new
test to overcome the F-test problems. They do not find evidence of CEO style affecting a
firm’s corporate policy. Therefore, at this point there is no consensus on whether CEOs
heterogeneous preferences could explain a firm’s corporate policy variation.
The tests used by the existing literature are only capable of providing a yes or no answer
to the influence of the systematic difference between CEOs on corporate policy. This is
specially problematic when we are considering an exogenous turnover. In these instances,
the firm should not be unsatisfied with the current CEO, and would probably be seeking
someone very similar. In this way, these tests might lead to incorrectly assert that there are
no differences between CEOs, and therefore there is no CEO style.
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In this paper, we suggest an additional step to analyze policy changes around a turnover.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper tried to provide a measure for the CEO style and di-
rectly quantify its effect on the firm’s policy. We explore the differences between the exiting
and new CEOs’ styles to evaluate their impact on corporate policy. The intuition behind this
measure is that changes should be more dramatic in the firm’s policies if the new CEO has
very different preferences than the CEO who is leaving. On the other hand, changes should
be less pronounced in firms where the exiting and the new CEO share precisely the same view.
We explore this framework using a two-step model. In the first step, we calculate CEO
fixed-effects. Similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) we construct a panel of CEOs of firms
that had at least one of their CEOs observed in two different firms. This panel allows us to
separate the CEOs’ fixed effects and the firm’s fixed effect. In the second step, we quantify
the impact of the CEO on the changes in firm’s policy by regressing the policy variables on
the differences between the estimated fixed-effects of the exiting and the incoming CEOs.
This two-step procedure allows us to quantify the effects of CEO’s preferences (style) on
corporate policy at the time of their arrival to the new firm. In contrast to the previous
suggested tests, our method provide the extent and the direction we should expect the CEO
to change the policy to be: If we are seeing a low leverage CEO being replace by a high
leverage CEO, we should observe an increase in leverage in that firm after the turnover. In
addition, our measure is just a one year shock to the policy, which mitigates the criticisms
about serial-correlations raised by Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011).
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We find that firms that replace their manager by someone with a very different style
present a more pronounced change in their policy. This is true for all the policies we con-
sider in our analysis. Our results are also economically significant. For instance, our model
predict that a firm that replace their CEO with someone that prefer his leverage level 10%
higher than the exiting CEO, should experience a change of 4.7% change in their policy right
in the year of the turnover.
The fact that the difference in the styles is correlated with the change is consistent with
matching theory. Firms seem to be choosing CEOs with specific skills to do the job based
on what they expect for the future of the firm. The endogenous matching raise concerns
about the estimators of CEO impact on corporate policy. If firms are anticipating the policy
changes needed, we could observe the same results in the absence of the turnover, or even if
we replaced this CEO be any other CEO we would find the same results. In order to further
investigate the endogenous matching we analyze how our results change in the sub-sample
of turnovers classified as exogenous. If these turnovers were truly exogenous they would
mitigate at least partially the bias on our estimates. For this reason, the estimators for this
group would be smaller than for the whole sample of turnovers. Our results reject the exo-
geneity of the sub-sample. Our results remain largely unchanged for these sub-sample. The
only estimates that are reduced are the estimates for Asset Growth. For all the other policies
we are analyzing, the effect of the whole sample and the sub-sample of exogenous turnovers
are exactly the same. This results reinforce the idea of endogenous matching. Even for the
cases in which the CEO exited for unforeseeable reasons the firm carefully selected the CEO
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replacement.
We conduct our analysis in a number of steps. In Section 2.2, we present the data
necessary for our analysis, explain our hand collection process to obtain the reason for the
exit and present the summary statistics of the main variables we will use in our analysis.
In Section 2.3, we study the characteristics of firm’s turnovers. We compare firms under-
going internal turnovers, external turnovers, with firms in normal times. We observe that
turnovers are associated with the firm’s performance and that external turnovers seem to
be even more critical than internal turnovers. We then use the information obtained from
our hand collected data and define a sub-group of turnovers in which it is less likely that
an unobservable factor is affecting both the policy and the probability of the turnover. We
classify exogenous turnovers cases where the reasons listed are: death, illness, outside offer,
or the CEO remained in the firm in a different position. This classification guarantees that
either the turnover was unplanned or was part of a friendly succession plan, which mitigate
the probability that there is an unobservable factor influencing both the policy and the prob-
ability of the exit.
In section 2.4 we revisit the joint tests used in the literature of CEO fixed effects to
select which variables we will use in our analysis. Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) point
out several problems with the F-tests, however they never suggest an alternative that would
allow us to correctly do the joint tests. They offer a test for the evaluation of the impact on
the mean and variability of the residuals of the firm’s policy. We will argue that this tests
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have a low power, because it is not clear that we need the distributions to change in order
to observe CEO fixed effects. The residuals could be drawn from the same distribution and
yet firms present changes in their policy. Therefore, while Bertrand and Schoar (2003) has
a high false positive rate, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) has a low probability of rejecting
the null when it is actually false. We explore two joint tests that control for the multiplicity
issue that invalidate the F-test. Instead of providing a yes or no answer to the joint test,
this procedures provide the percentage of CEOs for which we can reject the null, control-
ling for the possibility of a rare event. We find that only dividends, interest coverage and
advertising expenses fail to present an substantial amount of rejection in their test. All the
other variables considered present more than 25% of their CEOs rejecting the null that their
fixed effects are equal to zero. As a consequence of this results we drop dividends, interest
coverage and advertising expenses from our main analysis. In section 2.6 we present our
main results. In section 2.7 we present our concluding remarks.
2.2 Data
Our data set comes from three pieces of data. The firm’s financial information comes from
the COMPUSTAT files. All variables considered here are deflated to 1990 value. We follow
the standard filters of the literature: We drop financial (SIC between 6000 and 6999), utilities
(SIC between 4900 and 4949) and quasi-public firms (SIC greater than 8880). We also drop
small firms (Total assets less than $ 10 million dollars or Property, Plant and Equipment less
than $ 6 million dollars), and observations that seem to have measurement errors, i.e. firms
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with excessive (more than double in a year) growth in their Property, Plant and Equipment,
Total Assets and Sales are dropped. We also drop firms with missing total assets or missing
market-to-book ratio. Finally, we drop firms with negative market-too book ratio. We
winsorize all variables in our analysis at the 0.1% level.
The CEO information is coming from EXECUCOMP, and we restrict our attention to
CEOs. We initially obtain every CEO turnover available in the data. We check the cases in
which the CEO could be observed prior in the data and label this cases external turnovers.
To avoid mislabeling, only after we define all turnover cases we merge this data with the
financial information.
To diminish the biases associated to turnovers, we hand collect data on the reasons why
the CEO left the firm and define a sub-group of turnovers in which it is less likely that an
unobservable factor is affecting both the policy and the probability of the turnover. We
search a Wall Street Journal database, for the first and last name of the former and new
CEO, the name of the firm and the date of the turnover. We then read between 2 and 4
(depending on availability) articles about the turnover and capture a few key words about it.
Table 2.3 presents the results of the hand collection process. We were able to find news
on 379 external (outside hire) turnovers. We find that around 32% of the turnovers explic-
itly say that the CEO resigned or was forced out of the firm. Around 25% of the observed
external turnovers where due to retirement. And for another 26% the CEO stayed in the
firm performing a different activity (for instance, chairman of the board). We still observe
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a few other reasons for the turnovers, such as outside offer, death, illness and corruption
scandal that total 7% of our cases. We also are unable to identify the reason of the turnover
for around 10% of our sample.
Table 2.7 present the summary statistics for the main variables considered in this study.
We present the summary statistics separate for each piece of data considered in this pa-
per. We start in column (1) presenting the sample of all COMPUSTAT companies for the
years between 1992 and 2010. In Column (2) we narrow the sample for the firms we were
able to match with the EXECUCOMP dataset, this is the sample we will be considering
for our analysis (treatment and control). Column (3) presents the summary statistics of
firms undergoing an external turnover (treated - not exogenous). Column (4) presents the
summary statistics for a sub-sample of firms undergoing external turnovers that we classify
as exogenous. None of the variables considered here have statistically significant differences
across the groups. We will discuss more about the differences across groups (3) and (4) in
the next section.
2.3 What drives turnovers?
Disentangle the CEO’s preferences from the “firm’s preferences” is a very challenging pro-
cess. It is very hard to see what is influencing the decision, a firm characteristic or a CEO
characteristic. In order to try to separate the two, the literature has relied on turnovers.
In addition to that, in order to really separate the actions of the firm and the actions of
the CEO, we need to observe the CEO in two different firms Bertrand and Schoar (2003).
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The assumption behind the idea of using turnovers is that nothing is changing in the firm,
except the manager. However, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) point out that it might not
be reasonable to use them: a turnover is a very sensitive time of a firm (e.g. Murphy and
Zimmerman, 1993; Denis and Denis, 1995), in general associated with poor performance (e.g.
Weisbach, 1988; Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988). It is very costly to fire a CEO Taylor
(2010) and it rarely happens (e.g. Kaplan and Alcamo Minton, 2006; Huson, Parrino, and
Starks, 2001), and it is usually associated with bad firm or industry performance (e.g. Ka-
plan and Alcamo Minton, 2006; Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Weisbach, 1988; Warner,
Watts, and Wruck, 1988). External turnovers are an even more dramatic situation for a firm
(e.g. Parrino, 1997; Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001). Not only the firm decided to change
the CEO, but the board of directors decided that no one inside the firm’s ranks was capable
of taking over the job (most commonly an executive from inside is selected). Therefore we
are dealing with a very specific occasion where it might not be feasible to separate what is
been driven by the firm’s current situation from what is been driven by the CEO’s preferences.
In order to put numbers to this explanation, we ran a multinomial logit model in order
to compare firm years with no turnovers, with firm years with internal turnovers and firm
years with external turnovers. Our Dependent variable is as follows:
Dep.V ar. =

0 No Turnover
1 Internal Turnover
2 External Turnover
(2.1)
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Table 2.2 presents the results of the multinomial logit regressions. No turnover is the
base for the analysis. Column (1) shows the correlations for external turnovers, while col-
umn (2) shows the correlations for internal turnovers. The results indicate that both kinds
of turnovers are a delicate moment in the firm’s life. However, as we expected it seems that
external turnovers are more extreme. Firms with low asset growth are more likely to go
through an external turnover. On the other hand, firms with low asset growth, lower returns
on asset and higher leverage are more likely to make e external turnover. Our results show
that external turnovers are associated to a more extreme situation. A good anecdotal exam-
ple of a firms that are going through external turnovers is Yahoo!. They had 5 turnovers in
the past 5 years (between 2007 and 2012), the past three CEOs came from other firms (Carol
Bartz from HP, Scott Thompson from PayPal, and their current CEO Marissa Mayer from
Google). They are an anecdotal evidence that when a firm resort on outside hire it really
means that the situation of the firm is unstable. The results of the multinomial logit regres-
sions are consistent with Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) and indicate that using external
turnovers might not allow us to truly separate the impact of the CEO from a unobservable
factor that is affecting both the policy and the likelihood of the turnover.
Next, we determine what would be the instances that we would consider exogenous. Our
main concern was with the fact that firms are aware of the negative consequences that a
turnover has, and for this reason they could be trying to hide the true reason for the change.
Deceases 2, illness, and outside offers Hayes and Schaefer (1999) are the most obviously
2Other papers explore these turnovers, for example: Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007),
Bruce Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985), Hayes and Schaefer (1999), Salas (2010) and Slovin
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exogenous and would be very unlikely faked by the company. However, we only 7% of the
cases fall in these three categories. Thus, we needed to incorporate other reasons to increase
our sample of turnovers. Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) use “natural retirements” in which
they find no evidence that the CEO was forced out 3. Although we think this is appropriated
for some of the cases, we think that this selection is subjected to errors. Figure 2.1 shows
the distribution of the retirement age. CEOs retire as early as 48 years old and as late as 71.
Some firms could for example wait too long, to the point that the productivity of the CEO
is low for a couple of years. Knowing that the CEO is at retirement age would increase the
firm’s incentive to dress a forced retirement (due to decreasing productivity) as a natural
one. For this reason, beside death, illness and outside offers we only consider exogenous the
cases in which the CEO remains in the firm in a different activity (for example chairman
of the board). This way we are sure that the firm is reasonably satisfied with the CEO, to
want to keep her in the firm’s ranks. This way, these turnovers would be more of a natural
succession process. In addition to that, staying in the firm will ensure that the CEO is liable
to any of her decisions prior to leaving the helm.
In order to provide evidence that the turnovers we consider here are truly not related
to firm performance we make a informal test of the quality of the turnover. We run a
multinomial logit with the following dependent variable:
and Sushka (1993)
3Natural Retirements are also used in Denis and Denis (1995)
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Dep.V ar.2 =

0 No Turnover
1 Exogenous Turnovers
2 Non Exogenous Turnovers
(2.2)
We are calling our second category “Non Exogenous Turnovers” to indicate that this
is the group that was not classified as exogenous according to our methodology. We are
acknowledging that there might be cases that were truly exogenous but we did not classify
them as exogenous due to the rigor of our classification.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the multinomial logit regressions. None of the perfor-
mance measures considered helped explain exogenous turnovers. This is only a informal test,
because we are mainly concerned with unobservable variables and cannot see their differences
between the two groups. However, this is an indication that we are dealing with turnovers
that are not associated to the situation of the firm, but a natural transition inside the firm.
2.4 Selecting Variables of Interest: Joint Significance
Tests
The two ways previously used in the existing literature to measure the existence of CEO
heterogeneity are F-tests Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and changes in the mean and vari-
ability ration of the residual of firm’s policy around the announcement of the turnover Fee,
Hadlock, and Pierce (2011). Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) point out different problems
of estimating CEO heterogeneity using the F-tests. The main criticism of the F-test is the
multiplicity issue of joint significance test. The multiplicity issue is the fact that when we
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increase the number of hypothesis being tested simultaneously, the probability that we will
encounter a rare results increases. For instance, when testing 10 different hypothesis at a
5% level, there is more than 40% chance of having one or more type I errors. Since in the
CEO fixed effects we are dealing with thousands of hypothesis, the probability of getting a
type I error is close to one. This way, the results will not reflect a true rejection of the null
hypothesis, but simply the existence of an outlier in our analysis.
Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011) nicely point out this issue, and show in several different
falsification tests that the results are extremely inconsistent. However, the alternative tests
suggested by them have a very low power. Their tests compare the mean and the variability
ratio of the residual of the corporate policy, before and after the turnover. The problem of
testing the mean is pointed out by them in the paper, while we expect changes, it is not
clear that we should observe every new ceo moving in the same direction: some of them
will increase the policy and others will decrease it, possibly generating no changes in the
mean. More generally, it is not clear that we need this distribution to change in order to find
evidence, we could have the error terms drawn from the same distributions and yet observe
individual changes in the policy.The same argument is valid for the variability test, when
they divide the residual of the firm by the residual of a matched firm, if we are still drawing
from the same distribution we do not necessarily need to see changes on average to guarantee
the existence of CEO heterogeneity.
Our measure will try to address the problems with the low power of the tests found on
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Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2011), however, before we move to the main analysis, we will
revisit joint tests of CEO heterogeneity correcting for the multiplicity issue. Chapter 3 of
Efron (2010) has an extensive explanation on the multiplicity issue and how to correct for it.
Here we are summarizing the ideas presented in this chapter of the book, for a more detailed
explanation please refer to Efron (2010).
The Family-Wise Error rat or FWER is defined as the probability of makint at least one
false rejection in a family of hypothesis-testing problem.
FWER = Pr{Reject any true H0i} (2.3)
The FWER control procedures we will use are algorithms that inputs a family of p-values
(p1, p2, ..., pN) and outputs the list of accepted and rejected null hypotheses, subject to the
constraint:
FWER ≤ α (2.4)
We will consider two procedures suggested at Efron (2010), chapter 3: Bonferroni’s and
Holm’s (stepwise) procedures. The classic FWER control method is the Bonferroni’s bound,
in which we reject those null hypothesis for which:
pi ≤ α/N (2.5)
We will use the S˘ida´k procedure, which improves on the Bonferroni bound by rejecting
those hypotheses H0i for which:
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pi ≤ 1− (1− α)(1/N) (2.6)
In addition we will use a more elaborate test called Holm’s procedure: let te ordered
p-values be denoted by
p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ p(3) ≤ . . . ≤ p(N) (2.7)
We will reject H0(i), the hypothesis corresponding to p(i), if
p(j) ≤ α
N − j + 1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , i (2.8)
Table 2.5 present the percentage of CEO fixed effects that reject the null hypothesis that
there is no CEO heterogeneity. We separate the results in three panels. In the first panels we
consider all CEOs turnovers. It is important to emphasize that we are dealing with a panel
of CEOs who belong to firms that have at least one manager who is observed in two different
firms. In the second panel we focus on the CEOs that can be observed in two different firms.
For this cases, we can separate the CEO fixed effects from the firm fixed effects. Finally,
we focus on the CEOs that are observed in two different firms and for which the exit of the
formal CEO was classified as exogenous (death, illness and natural retirements).
Columns (1), (4) and (7) of table 2.5 show the results for a simple t-test on the coefficient.
This resulst are subjected to the multiplicity issue and as expected, except for dividends and
Advertising Expenses, all the variables present the majority of the CEOs presenting a signif-
68
icant fixed effect. Columns (2), (5) and (8) presents the results using Bonferroni’s procedure,
while columns (3), (6) and (9) present the results for the Holm’s procedure. The contrasts
between the t-test results and the results adjusting for FWER show that there is a large
effect of outlier in the original Bertrand and Schoar (2003) results. Nevertheless, even after
controlling for FWER we still get a substantial amount of CEOs rejecting the null hypothesis
that there is no heterogeneity. The results are largely robust when we focus on the subsample
of exogenous turnovers, which means that even for this cases we would still observe CEO
fixed effect for a substantial fraction of the sample.
The purpose of this section is to select the variables we will use in our analysis, based on
the variables that actually seem to be presenting CEO fixed effects. It is important to say
that after controlling for FWER, if we find 1 manager that affects the policy, we would be
able to reject the null that CEOs don’t matter. All our variables pass this criteria. However,
as a practical matter we will drop the variables with less than one quarter of the CEOs
affecting the policy as we are not observing a lot of CEO heterogeneity in this variables. For
this reason, we are dropping Dividends, Interest Coverage and Advertising Expenses policies
and claim that we did not find a strong evidence of CEOs influencing this variables beyond
the firm characteristics.
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2.5 Fixed Effects Differential
In addition to the challenge of separating turnovers that would allow us to identify the dif-
ferences between the firm’s maximization problem and the CEO impact, it is also difficult
to determine a precise measure for this impact. The standard way of testing CEO styles was
through F-tests. However, besides the endogeneity problem discussed above, Fee, Hadlock,
and Pierce (2011) point out that F-tests are not appropriate due to serial-correlations. They
run a series of falsification tests and show that the significance in the F-test results might be
spurious. Finally, they advert to warning about the validity of F-test “on an asymptotically
exploding number of dummy variables in a non-normal setting” Wooldridge (2010). they pro-
pose a regression model to capture all the other factors not related to the CEO style. They
then test for CEOs’ style comparing the standard error of the residuals of firms undergoing
exogenous turnovers and matched firms in normal times. They find no evidence of CEO style.
Both tests suggested in these papers can only provide a yes or no answer to the influence
of CEOs’ heterogeneity on corporate policy. We develop a new methodology to try to capture
the CEOs impact on a firm’s corporate policy. We argue that both ways previously used
in the literature lack a measure of the contrast between the new and the former CEO. We
should observe a more acute impact in turnovers where the new CEO has an extremely
different view than the exiting one, than in turnovers involving CEOs with similar views.
For this reason, we develop a measure to compare the differences between the CEOs’ views.
In order to capture that, we use a very simple rational (already available on Fee, Hadlock,
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and Pierce (2011)) derived from a equation in differences. Let the level of a given corporate
decision variable be defined as follows:
yi,t = βXi,t−1 + δt + µi + µe + i,t (2.9)
Where yi,t is the corporate policy (such as leverage, Investment, R&D expenses, etc.),
Xi,t−1 is a set of time-varying controls that include the industry’s average for the same year
and other firm specific controls, δt are the year’s fixed effects, µi are the firm’s fixed effects
and µe are the executive fixed effects. If we take the first difference of this model will get
the following:
yi,t = βXi,t−1 + δt + µi + µe + i,t (−)
yi,t−1 = βXi,t−2 + δt−1 + µi + µe′ + i,t−1
∆yi,t = γ∆Xi,t−1 + ∆δt + (µe − µe′)∆i,t
During the normal times (µe−µe′) = 0 while during a turnover it could be different than
zero. This equation point out the fact that in order to observe any changes in the policy
due to the CEO we need a contrast between the CEOs. If both CEOs have the exact same
view about that particular policy we should not observe any changes. In addition to that
this measure will allow us to have some predictability about the direction of the impact of a
CEO once he enters the firm.
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In order to capture that we develop a two-step procedure. In the first step we estimate
the CEO fixed effects for the exogenous turnovers classified according to the previous section
using equation 2.9. The first-step will provide us µˆe. Subsequently, in the second step we
use the estimated CEO fixed effects to measure the impact of the CEO in several corporate
polices using three different specifications in the first one we analyze the changes on the year
of the turnover.
∆yi,j,t = γ∆Xi,j,t−1 + β1(µˆe′ − µˆe)t + δt + i,t (2.10)
This way we will observe if there was a change right after the CEO arrival. In this
specification we are trying to get a one year shock to the policy that was caused by the
CEO. (µˆe′ − µˆe)t is capturing the impact on the year of the CEO arrival. In general, the
CEO arrives sometime during the year, therefore in year t she will be in the helm for only a
fraction of the year. Following the existing literature we also have an alternative specification
in which we give the CEO three years to establish his style:
∆yi,t = γ∆Xi,t−1 + τ
i=2∑
k=0
[(µˆe′ − µˆe)]t−k + δt + i,t (2.11)
This way we will see if the average behavior of the new CEO in her initial years will differ
from the rest of the sample. It is important to note that we run the second stage models
on levels and not differences, to allow us we included the firm’s fixed effects in our regressions.
There is an important caveat to our methodology. In order to do precisely what we want
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to do, we would need to have both the former and the new CEO observed in different firms.
This way we would truly be observing the CEO characteristic separated from the firm’s
characteristic. However, we are only able to observe the new CEO in two different positions.
The number of cases in which we can actually observe both executives in different firms is
very small and would not allow us to estimate the impact. For this reason what we are truly
measuring is the difference between the new CEO fixed effects separated from the firm and
a mixture of the exiting CEO fixed effect and the firm fixed effect for the period she CEO
was in charge.
In order to evaluate how our results change for the subsample of turnovers in which
the exit of the former CEO was labeled exogenous, we interact our main variables with an
indicator of exogenous turnovers as follows:
∆yi,j,t = γ∆Xi,j,t−1 + β1(µˆe′ − µˆe)t + β1(µˆe′ − µˆe)t ∗ Exog + Exog + δt + i,t (2.12)
This way we will be able to capture whether or not the exogenous classification is dimin-
ishing the effects and therefore removing any existing bias from our measures.
2.6 Changes in Corporate Policy Around Turnovers
In this section we will investigate how a firm’s corporate policy change following a turnover
depending on whether the replacement was very similar to the exiting CEO or if they were
very different. The underlying hypothesis here is that we should observe more dramatic
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changes in firms that replace a CEO with someone very different, while we should not
expect a lot of change if the new CEO arrives to a place where his style is already in place.
Table 2.6 shows the results for the three year impact around the turnover. All the vari-
ables considered here present a significant change in firms that have a dramatic change in
the style of their manager. The results are also economically significant. For instance, a
firm that replaces a CEO with someone that commonly prefers investment levels 10% higher
than the exiting CEO will on average experience a 3.5% increase in their investment levels
right in the year of the turnover. Returns on Assets (ROA) and R&D Expenditure seem to
be the most affected around the turnover.
Since there is a possible mechanical relation between yi,t and µe,t we also run the regres-
sions calculating the CEO fixed effects removing year t from the calculation. This way we
are in fact, removing yi,t and yi,t−1 from the calculation of the fixed effect differential at year
t. Panel B shows the results, even though the slightly smaller, they are qualitatively the
same and the conclusion remain unchanged.
Table 2.7 provide similar results but giving the CEO three years to establish their style.
The results get slightly attenuated when we average them out over three years, however
the conclusion are still the same. We still observe a significant change in policy around the
announcement of a more extreme management change.
Consistent with matching theory, these results are evidence that firms are selecting CEOs
to do a specific job inside the firm. When the boards of directors believe that the firm should
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increase their investment levels, they hire a CEO that is comfortable leading an aggressive
investment policy. These raises concerns about the interpretation of the coefficients we have.
With endogenous matching one should expect that the policy would have changed regardless
of the CEO changes. The board of directors already know what needs to be done, and is
simply hiring the correct person for the job. This way we would not be capturing the effects
of CEOs, but possibly the bias on this endogenous decision.
In order to further investigate this issue, we analyze how our results are affected when
we consider the classification of exogenous exit, largely used in the literature. These criteria
classifies a turnover as exogenous when the CEO was not forced out, but actually left for
exogenous reasons (death, illness or natural retirement). Assuming that endogenous match-
ing is happening throughout the sample, and it is biasing our estimator, these sub-sample
should be able to capture some of the bias and our estimator should be smaller for these
sub-group.
The second line of panels A and B on both Tables 2.6 and 2.7 presents the results of the
interaction of our main results with an indicator of exogenous turnovers. The only estimator
that seems to be corrected by the classification is the estimator asset growth. All the other
estimators are exactly the same for all the turnovers and the sub-group of exogenous ones.
This reinforce the idea of endogenous matching. Even in the situations in which the CEO
leaves for unforeseeable reasons the firm is still selecting their replacement very carefully and
this is reflected on the changes that follow the turnover.
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Taken all together our results imply that firms are indeed choosing their CEO, and that
using exogenous exits to try to mitigate a possible endogeneity problem does not solve the
problem because the selection is not only on the exit but it is also on the choice of new CEO.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a new method to analyze the changes in corporate policies around
a CEO turnover. We explore a two-step procedure in which in the first step we calculate
the CEO fixed effects, and then use the differences between the fixed-effects of the exiting
and the incoming CEO. Thus, we explore the contrast between the CEOs’ preferences to try
to differentiate firms that will have a more pronounced change, from firms that will likely
remain the same. We find that firms that reach out for CEOs that are very different than
the exiting one present a more pronounced change than firms that simply look for someone
with similar views as those of the exiting CEO.
Our results provide evidence of endogenous matching between firm and CEOs. They
suggest that firms are anticipating the changes needed and are hiring a CEO that is com-
fortable running that given policy. We find that our results remain largely unchanged when
we use a sub-sample of exogenous turnover, which indicate that even in circumstances in
which the CEO left for exogenous reasons, the replacement was carefully chosen by the board
of directors to run a specific policy on the firm from that point on. Other two important
points of the paper are one, to show that, using appropriate tests we can observe changes in
policies around the announcement of the turnover. And two, provide tests of CEO hetero-
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geneity that are not subjected to the F-test criticism to find that there is CEO heterogeneity.
Different CEOs seem to be using different policies, beyond what could be explained by the
other observable. Both of these claims are unaffected when we restrict our attention to ex-
ogenous exits. We, however, do not believe this heterogeneity is causal, as we have evidence
of endogenous matching.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Retirement age distribution aroung 65 years old
This figure displays the distribution of ages at which the CEOs have retired in our data base. This
picture is a clear indication that the CEO is choosing the year in which she is going to retire,
therefore even retirements that were not clearly forced could have clearly been anticipated by the
CEO and influenced her actions before leaving the office.
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2.9 Tables
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the main variables used in this studies. Column (1) show the
firms characteristics for the COMPUSTAT world for the years between 1992 and 2010. Column (2) show
the characteristics for the firms we were able to merge with EXECUCOMP database. Column (3) shows the
results for firms undergoing an external turnover. Column (4) show the summary statistics for a subgroup of
firms undergoing an external turnover that we classify as exogenous turnovers according to the methodology
developed in section 2.3.
Compustat Compustat/
Execucomp
External
Turnovers
Exogenous
Turnovers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 5.958 6.824 7.101 6.993
(1.801) (1.487) (1.429) (1.464)
Market− to−Book 1.41 1.665 1.384 1.554
(1.189) (1.326) (0.854) (0.95)
CashF low 0.325 0.459 0.332 0.486
(0.708) (0.781) (0.93) (0.988)
ReturnsonAssets 0.023 0.042 0.014 0.025
(0.085) (0.072) (0.08) (0.069)
Investments 0.247 0.261 0.219 0.251
(0.203) (0.194) (0.171) (0.171)
Leverage 0.255 0.202 0.224 0.18
(0.239) (0.2) (0.205) (0.178)
CashHoldings 0.129 0.14 0.143 0.18
(0.168) (0.174) (0.161) (0.183)
Dividends 0.084 0.097 0.168 0.135
(13.85) (3.724) (0.408) (0.508)
InterestCoverag 41.599 65.855 18.346 67.322
(461.214) (512.311) (91.081) (525.761)
R&DExpenses 0.025 0.031 0.036 0.042
(0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.058)
SellingandGenralExpenses 0.222 0.224 0.253 0.263
(0.319) (0.175) (0.177) (0.183)
AdvertisingExpenses 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.015
(0.037) (0.04) (0.044) (0.038)
Observations 54623 20724 388 127
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.2: Multinomial Logit
This paper presents the results of the multinomial logit regressions with a three level categorical variable as
the dependent variable. The categories are No turnover, Internal Turnover or External turnover. For each
year the firm is assigned to one of this categories depending on the CEO status. The results indicate that the
circumstances in which most CEOs leave office is not uncorrelated to the corporate finance variables of the
firm, therefore indicating endogeneity on the decision. More specifically, the external turnover (turnovers in
which the CEO came from a different firm) seems to represent a even more extreme situation. No turnover
is used as the reference for the multinomial logit.
External Turnovers Internal Turnovers
VARIABLES (1) (2)
Market Leverage 0.582** -0.0165
(0.231) (0.109)
Investment 1.062 0.130
(0.899) (0.372)
Return on Assets -2.065*** -0.477
(0.620) (0.321)
Asset Growth -0.952*** -0.822***
(0.275) (0.126)
Observations 20,996
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Take away: This table shows Turnovers are in general a dramatic moment for the firm,
and external turnovers (CEOs that are observed in two different firms, which we use
to identify CEO FE) are even more dramatic. They are not happening for exogenous
reasons.
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Table 2.3: Reasons Previous CEO Left Office
This table presents the reasons why the exiting CEO on a external turnover (outside hire) is leaving the
firm. The information is manually collected from Wall Street Journal articles.
Reasons Occurrences
Stayed in company 110
Outside offer 14
Deceased 3
Illness 1
Retirement 106
Resigned 73
Forced out 62
Interim 3
Scandal 6
Belonged to turnaround consult 1
Unknown 40
Total 419
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Table 2.4: Multinomial Logit
This table presents the results of the multinomial logit regressions with a three level categorical variable as
the dependent variable. The categories are No turnover, Exogenous Turnover or Endogenous turnover. For
each year the firm is assigned to one of this categories depending on the CEO status and the reason of the
turnover. Exogenous turnovers are turnovers in which the CEO stayed in the company but in a different
position, indicating that she was not forced out. The results indicate that our definition of exogenous
turnovers is correctly selecting exogenous turnovers, because the changes in the corporate variable do not
increase the probability of a “exogenous” turnover happening. Therefore, these turnovers appear not to be
related to the underlying situation of the firm. No turnover is used as the reference for the multinomial
logit.
Variables Exogenous Non - Exogenous
Book Leverage -0.990 0.0715
(1.340) (0.102)
Investment -6.452 0.268
(7.855) (0.351)
Returns on Assets 2.426 -0.755**
(3.458) (0.297)
Asset Growth -1.090 -0.840***
(1.496) (0.118)
Observations 20,996
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Take away: This table shows that the exogenous classification is doing a decent job
selecting firms that are not undergoing a difficult time. It seems indeed that CEOs
did not leave because of poor performance.
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Table 2.5: CEO Impact on Performance - Returns on Assets
This table presents the results of the second stage regressions of performance variables. The variable µˆe′− µˆe
represents the difference between the estimated fixed effects of the new CEO and the old CEO obtained from
the first stage regressions of the different variables from the exogenous turnovers. Panel A presents the
impact on Returns on Assets and panel B on asset growth. The results show that the new CEOs do impact
the both leverage and the cash holding policy, but do not impact on the dividends of the firm.
All CEOs Observed in 2 Firms Exogenous
t-test Bonf Holms t-test Bonf Holms t-test Bonf Holms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Investment Decisions
Invest 78% 44% 46% 80% 40% 42% 82% 50% 54%
Panel B: Financing Decisions
Mkt. Lev. 77% 52% 53% 74% 47% 47% 76% 46% 46%
Cash Holdings 66% 42% 43% 62% 36% 37% 67% 39% 39%
Dividends 19% 7% 7% 21% 9% 9% 20% 12% 12%
Int. Cov. 67% 8% 10% 69% 6% 6% 67% 1% 1%
Panel C: Operational Decisions
R&D Exp. 60% 28% 30% 56% 27% 27% 63% 37% 38%
Adv. Exp. 45% 22% 23% 45% 22% 22% 37% 18% 18%
S&G Exp. 73% 42% 44% 71% 40% 40% 64% 40% 40%
Panel D: Performance
ROA 77% 50% 51% 75% 46% 48% 76% 48% 49%
Asset Growth 85% 67% 69% 84% 65% 67% 80% 63% 64%
Num. of CEOs 2548 2548 2548 344 344 344 76 76 76
Take away: It is possible to run joint tests that are not subjected to the F-test crit-
icism and find that a substantial number of CEOs reject the null that their fixed
effect equals zero. This analysis allows us to exclude Dividends, InterestCoverage and
AdvertisingExpenses as we find a weak evidence of CEO heterogeneity on this policies.
The tests remain unchanged when we focus our attention to Exogenous turnovers,
which reinforce the results for the next two tables.
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Table 2.6: Changes in Corporate Policy at the year of Turnover
This table presents the results of the second stage regressions. The variable µˆe′− µˆe represents the difference
between the estimated fixed effects of the exiting and the incoming CEOs, obtained from the first stage
regressions. Exog is an indicator of exogenous exits (Death, Illness and Natural Retirements). Each column
presents the change in a different corporate policy. Inv are firm investments, Lev if Market Leverage, Cash
are the firm’s cash holdings, R&D are R&D expenses, SGA are Seeling and General Expenses, ROA are
returns on assets and AGrow are assets growth. Panel A presents the results using the estimated fixed
effects using all the observations for a given CEO. Panel B presents the results removing year t from the
calculation to mitigate any mechanical relationship.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Inv Lev Cash R&D SGA ROA AGrow
Panel A: Full Fixed Effect
(µe − µe′) 0.354*** 0.474*** 0.549*** 0.797*** 0.269*** 0.687*** 0.434***
(5.371) (8.840) (6.009) (3.471) (3.131) (4.938) (9.627)
(µe − µe′) ∗ Exog 0.114 -0.025 -0.318 0.982 0.003 0.201 -0.486***
(0.837) (-0.151) (-1.633) (1.029) (0.018) (0.636) (-2.994)
Exog -0.032*** -0.020* 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.006 -0.054**
(-2.804) (-1.784) (0.302) (-0.838) (-0.769) (0.948) (-2.239)
R2 0.0990 0.142 0.107 0.113 0.0429 0.139 0.383
Panel B: Fixed Effect excluding year t
(µe − µe′) 0.468*** 0.427*** 0.456*** 0.744*** 0.313*** 0.609*** 0.531***
(7.712) (11.739) (7.803) (7.745) (3.799) (8.610) (14.327)
(µe − µe′) ∗ Exog -0.128 0.077 -0.127 0.685 -0.102 -0.341 -0.435**
(-1.081) (0.573) (-0.687) (0.894) (-0.835) (-1.625) (-2.101)
Exog -0.022** -0.021** 0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.006 -0.044**
(-2.215) (-2.187) (0.198) (0.191) (-1.252) (0.775) (-2.120)
R2 0.112 0.157 0.117 0.160 0.0621 0.165 0.391
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9,045 9,045 9,046 9,045 9,181 9,034 9,015
Gvkeys 1,263 1,263 1,262 1,263 1,279 1,262 1,259
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Take away: Firms that replace their CEO by another one with a very different char-
acteristic present more pronounced changes in their policy at tje year of the turnover.
This changes are insensitive to the inclusion of exogenous turnovers (except for asset
growth), which indicate that the endogeneity is at the selection. Even firms in which
CEOs exit for unforeseeable reasons carefully select their replacement.
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Table 2.7: Average Changes in Corporate Policy in the First Three Years of New CEO
This table presents the results of the second stage regressions. The variable
∑2
t==0(µe − µe′) is a vector of
the sum of the differences in estimated, obtained from the first stage regressions of the different variables
from the exogenous turnovers. This variable equals the difference between the estimated fixed effects in the
first three years (Years 0 to 2) and zero otherwise. Exog is an indicator of exogenous exits (Death, Illness
and Natural Retirements). Each column presents the change in a different corporate policy. Inv are firm
investments, Lev if Market Leverage, Cash are the firm’s cash holdings, R&D are R&D expenses, SGA are
Seeling and General Expenses, ROA are returns on assets and AGrow are assets growth. Panel A presents
the results using the estimated fixed effects using all the observations for a given CEO. Panel B presents the
results removing year t from the calculation to mitigate any mechanical relationship.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Inv Lev Cash R&D SGA ROA A Grow
Panel A: Full Fixed Effect∑2
t==0(µe − µe′) 0.295*** 0.342*** 0.331*** 0.314*** 0.207*** 0.449*** 0.430***
(7.527) (12.425) (6.711) (4.524) (3.737) (7.240) (15.386)∑2
t==0(µe − µe′) ∗ Exog 0.076 -0.033 -0.031 0.218 0.100 -0.027 -0.089
(0.903) (-0.414) (-0.312) (1.101) (1.307) (-0.148) (-0.779)
Exog -0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.018
(-0.765) (0.098) (-0.116) (-0.625) (1.126) (0.119) (-1.338)
R2 0.102 0.146 0.107 0.0839 0.0500 0.135 0.392
Panel B: Fixed Effect excluding year t
2∑
t==0
(µe − µe′) 0.231*** 0.279*** 0.277*** 0.301*** 0.231*** 0.288*** 0.407***
(5.693) (13.103) (7.541) (6.929) (9.542) (6.726) (16.028)
2∑
t==0
(µe − µe′) ∗ Exog 0.048 0.016 -0.000 0.048 -0.020 -0.087 -0.194**
(0.820) (0.308) (-0.002) (0.245) (-0.250) (-0.687) (-2.074)
Exog -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.015
(-0.077) (-0.158) (-0.398) (-0.850) (-0.140) (0.310) (-1.160)
R2 0.105 0.156 0.112 0.0977 0.0702 0.136 0.394
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 9,045 9,045 9,046 9,045 9,181 9,034 9,015
Gvkeys 1,263 1,263 1,262 1,263 1,279 1,262 1,259
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Take away: Similarly as Table 2.6, firms that replace their CEO by another one with
a very different characteristic present more pronounced changes in their policy in the
first three years of the new CEO. This changes are insensitive to the inclusion of
exogenous turnovers (except for asset growth), which indicate that the endogeneity
is at the selection. Even firms in which CEOs exit for unforeseeable reasons carefully
select their replacement.
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